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Foreword
Since 1962 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) has undertaken a conscious, organized effort--unequalled by
any other federal agency--to facilitate wider use of NASA-developed
technology by industry and other federal,, state, or local government
organizations.	 This effort has been,described variously as technology
utilization, technology application, cr technology transfer.	 Other
organizations have followed NASA's lead as more public leaders have
become interested in exploring how Federally-sponsored research and
technology might be tapped for programs and purposes other than those
for which it was originally undertaken. 	 The public investment is
considerable, and logic suggests that a reasonable effort should be
i
made to maximize its use.
It was in this setting that the Academy was asked by senior
1
officials at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center to establish a panel 1
to review the Goddard-Baltimore. Applications Project in order to
describe and to evaluate its achievements, to judge its impact, and
to assess its applicability elsewhere. 	 Most of the data was collected
by personal interview of those officials and others involved in one or
more tasks undertaken through the Project; thus the basic information
tends to be subjective and somewhat fragmented. 	 In spite of this, the
panel believes it had sufficient access to understand the nature and
operation of the Project and the essence of its accomplishments.
One cannot help but be impressed with the Baltimore Applications
Project as an example of'how good technical assistancecan be delivered.
"
There is much to be learned from this experiment for all kinds of
technical assistance projects, from level to level of government.
The report leaves a number of tantalizing questions unanswered:
What is NASA's role for technology transfer to local governments in the
future? Should liaison be established with Public Technology, Incorporated
and ;NSF-supported projects? How can such experiments receive wide publicity
and opportunity for application elsewhere? How does "user pull" strategy
fit with other transfer strategies? Is there a central coordinating role
to be played in Federal technology transfer efforts? The panel chose not
i
to deal with these broader, comparative questions due to the specific
nature of the task assigned to them and the pragmatic limits imposed by
time and res-ources available. They merit close attention in the future.
The Academy is indebted to the panel members for their considerable
dedication to this task, as well as to the many officials at the Goddard
Space Flight Center, the City of Baltimore, and other professionals con-
nected with the Project who generously made time and information available
to the panel,
George H. Esser
Executive Director
E
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Highlights
The Baltimore Applications Project was undertaken by the
Goddard Space Flight Center as an experiment in technology transfer--
a phenomenon in which Goddard's parent, the National Aeronautics and
.M. i
Space Administration, has had a continuing interest since its establish-
ment by the Space Act of 1958. The project has several characteristics
1
which, in combination, are unique, thereby providing a valuable means
for more fully understanding technology transfer and opportunities.
First, unlike much technology utilization or applications effort,
this project was initiated by the "user"- -Baltimore City officials.
Second, it is based upon a bilateral agreement between the City and
the Center which , clearly provides for institutional support from Goddard
to back up its technology transfer agent. Third, the project is free-
standing, the terms being established by the City and the Center with
no formal tie to other technology transfer or utilization systems--
i.e. the project has been unhindered in making whatever linkages seem
appropriate.
Much like NASA's cooperative international projects, the Baltimore
Applications Project gives the appearance of NASA providing the pre-
dominant amount of resources invested in the effort; yet the City has
contributed considerably through the time of officials involved, and
the data/experience from the experiment are equally available to all
(as. is the case in cooperative space ventures). As Baltimore officials
expected to.gain access to NASA technology, so Goddard officials expected
vii
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to`gain experience in working with a different clientele and a
different environment for applying technology. Baltimore expected
benefit from problem-solving activities; NASA expected benefit from
an expanded constituency, having responded to a perceived need
(recognized in NASA's charter legislation and reinforced by overt
Congressional interest).
Perhaps one of the most salient characteristics of the project
has been its focus upon providing practical access to Goddard's technical.
competence in contrast to an emphasis upon attempts to sell "off the shelf"
hardware. This required a considerably different strategy for transfer, em-
phasizing user-pull rather than the usual technology push.
The achievements of the Baltimore Applications Project .(BAP)
may be viewed from three perspectives: that of the public at large,
of the-City ` of Baltimore, and of Goddard S,nace Flight Center and NASA.
There were at least three benefits to th(i public at large growing
project:	 gout of the ro ect: (]_) valuable. insight on bow to facilitate user-
{
pull technology transfer; (2) a demonstration of the value, as well
as some of the obstacles, in this type of transfer; and (3) guidance
j for wider application of the technique. The BAP approach resulted in
high receptivity to potential technological applications, developed
an improved understanding and capacity among city officials for
evaluating technology and applications, and cultivated and promoted an
improved capability among city officials for linking with technology'
in future opportunities. Key elements of this approach for applica-
tion elsewhere are:
viii
tthe predominant initiative should lie with the user
community;
the technology transfer agent must be closely attuned
to user needs and problems, developing considerable
personal rapport;
the technology transfer agent must have daily access
to institutional technical support as well as a wide
range of contacts (in and outside that institution);
the top management of both organizations (here Baltimore
and Goddard) must support the activity, both symbolically
and through resource allocation;
the technology transfer agent must avoid pushing Federal
Agency program objectives or otherwise appear to act as
a partisan agent;
the technology transfer agent should have frequent access
to the top officials	 using organizations.
Baltimore benefited in four ways from the project: 	 (1) City
T	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
agencies have developed the capability for the more systematic review
and use of technology; (2) some 69 tasks were undertaken between
April 1974 and September 1976 involving technological problem identifica-
tion/solving; (3) both the-itrsa e n  techno-loglicat self-confidence Of
the City were improved; and (4) the City's technological sophistication
and, subsequently, its access to Federal funds for.technology-related
programs were enhanced.	 Most of the tasks (52) involved principally
technical consultation--the provision of data, information on techniques,
hardware, etc., or providing contacts in other agencies or industry.
The demonstration of technology constituted 13 tasks, while actual
research and development resulted from four. 	 Since the purpose of the
project was to help the City officials in evaluating and using technology,
Ix
rnot to sell them technology, the technology transfer agent frequently
was cast in the role of searching out data for the comparison of
technological alternatives. Often the result was that a decision
was confirmed rather than changed--resulting in "technological
I
assurance"--i.e. officials received data via a third party (the technology
agent) that their tentative, unaided choice was "the best". This proved
to be only one facet of the "tutoring" function by the technology
transfer agent which facilitated noticeable improvement in the
capability of the City todeal with technology)
The Goddard Space Flight Center benefited from this project,
principally in two ways: (1) by conducting a successful experiment
demonstrating user pull technology transfer; and (2) through the project,
enhancing the Center's (arid NASA's) image in the Baltimore area as well
as enlarging its constituency. Goddard did gain some experience and
broadened technical competence, but this was not as extensive as
originally anticipated, at least partly because of a reluctance among
some supervisors to permit their people to participate.
The Baltimore Applications Project was oriented to the process
of technology transfer, not to.selling Baltimore officials, upon the
acceptance and use of particular products of technology. Therefore,
the project results are principally in terms of changed process,
I
organizational enviionment, and institutional procedures--not in numbers
of specific applications of technology made. However, technical informa
x
tion and knowledge was applied, resulting in specific actions or
decisions.	 A great deal has been learned from this experiment, but
much remains to be learned and can be if it is continued.
The Panel makes two recommendations which it believes can
lead to an improved, more valuable Baltimore Applications Project
and enhance the successful transfer of NASA (and other Federally-
developed) technology.
First, the project should be continued for two more years;
second, a limited extension of the project (as an experiment) should
be tried a,,:,another location.	 Because a good many of the tasks under-
taken have yet to be completed, only fragmentary data has been available
to assess the impact of those tasks.
	 Also, the Panel believes that
several modifications can be made in the BAP operation that will pro-
vide valuable experience and further data by which to more fully
evaluate the success of the user-pull strategy.	 These include a more
determined effort to raise awareness of the project at Goddard and in
Baltimore; greater effort to identify NASA technology applicable to
Baltimore problems; taking a less conservative stance about involvement
in the implementation stage of tasks and in withholding_ assistance when
commercial sources are thought.to be available; and sharing of the
technology transfer agent's costs.
F Extending the experiment to another location is necessary in order
s to determine if the success in Baltimore is due to the strategy and
execution of the particular approach or because of factors peculiar
a f
a
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to Baltimore itself. Such a second experiment should be undertaken
only by request of a potential user, and should be carefully in-
strumented to provide fullest possible data.E
The Baltimore Applications Project has been an unqualified
success in meeting the objectives originally laid out for the project.
	 ..
It has made a substantial contribution to a more thorough understand--
ing of the technology transfer process. hike any experiment, it also
has opened new questions and avenues worthy of exploration.
r
J^
xii
Chapter I
Introduction
Why hasn't our national technical capability, applied
so successfully in the space and defense areas, been
applied equally successfully to a multitude of local
government problems? l/
`	 The Significance of the Baltimore Applications Project
The attempt to bring the technological competence of Federal
research and development programs to bear upon urban problems involves
at the least, three challenges: (1) the "secondary" use of Federally-
i
funded research and development, (2) the translation or adaptation of
this technology to problems in the cities, and (3) discovering inter-
.
organizational relationships/mechanisms to make such transplants
succeed. Quite apart from its statutory responsibility to make the
results of aeronautics and space research widely available, NASA has
long recognized the utility of secondary use of the research and }
development for which it is responsible. This recognition has spread
to other Federal agencies. p
During-the past few years there has been a growing
interest in the secondary use of research and
p	 p	 pdevelo ment out ut. If the output from a research
and development effort, over and beyond its initial
specific mission, can provide technology that is
productively used in many locations and/or by a
number of organizations, then the original cost of
the research can be viewed as providing a substantial
contribution over and above its primary task to satisfy
a specific and defined need. Secondary utilization of
research and development has attracted attention of
. . . [the highest government officials] as a logical
The Urban Institute, The Struggle to Bring Technology to Cities,
Washington,, D.C., 1971, page 5.
f
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method of enhancing the productive output of research and
development efforts. 2/
The second challenge, that of translating Federal technology to
useful applications in cities, has proved to be a formidable task. The
assumption is that cities have been using outmoded technology when
adaptation of existing technology might produce significant economic
savings and/or increase the quality of life. It is further asserted
that the necessary technology already exists, that the technological
community has the know-how to make whatever adaptations are necessary,
and that industry is eager to participate. These assertions remain
largely unvalidated and the barriers to such transfers between cities,
3/
industry, and technology are recognized to be formidable.
Lambright and Teich have reviewed a number of attempts to
transfer technology to the urban setting, concluding that the results,
particularly those attempts to transfer high technology originating in
Federal laboratories (such as space, atomic energy, and defense) to city
users who are accustomed to less advanced technologies, generally have
been disappointing. A key difficulty has been that of forming the
necessary interorganizational links. They conclude that "what is needed
is a coalition behind a transfer--an administrative 'delivery system'--
4/
that includes the lab_ (innovator), a manufacturer, and a user." 	 In
2/ J.A. Jolly, and J.W. Creighton (eds.), Technology Transfer in Research
and Development, Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, California, 1975.
31 Urban Institute, Op. Cit.
V W. Henry Lambright and Albert H. Teich, "Technology Transfer as a Problem
in Interorganizational Relationships", Administration and Society,
Vol. VIII, No. 1 (May 1976) pp. 29-54.
a)
3
essence, what Lambright and Teich are saying is that success in the
transfer of high technology to urban problems is more dependent upon
the process by which this transfer is attempted than upon the technology
involved.
The Baltimore Applications Project is particularly significant.
because, even as an experiment, it represents a distinct departure from
re !
,
NASA's previous approaches to the transfer of technology by its
Technology Utilization Program (TU Program) which has been an important
institutional activity since the early 1960s. The TU Program has been
directed principally toward secondary applications of existing NASA
technology. From the beginning, the modus operandi of the Baltimore
Applications' Project has been to have local officials define their problems,
with the NASA technological agent acting as "consultant" or information
link to technical competences in the NASA laboratory, not necessarily to
NASA technology already developed.* This experiment is impressive because:
,(1) it offers an unusual contribution tothe general body of knowledge
concerning technology transfer, (2) it provides an extraordinary learning
vehicle forNASA in the assessment and design of-future applications pro-
jects, and (3) it has been an excellentlearning vehicle for Baltimore._
The panel is especially impressed, because NASA has been a leader in
the attempt to develop successful modes to transfer technology, and this
* Other NASA Centers have provided personnel to state or local governments
as transfer agents. For example, the Kennedy Space Center made !an
official available  to the Illinois State Budget Office, so
experiment 	 not totally sui generis. See testimony of Edward
BAP
ward Z. Gray,
f	 Assistant Administrator for Industrial Affairs and Technology Utilization,
NASA, Technology Utilization, Hearings, Subcommittee.on Aerospace
Technology and National Needs, U.S. Senate, 94/2, Sept. 22,23,24, 1975,
pp. 454-463,
I I
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experiment is particularly challenging since there are few, if any,
precedents upon which it can draw. The non-advocacy, diplomatic, and
facilitative features of the Baltimore Applications Project have been
apparent to the panel. The low-key problem-oriented approach for	 ....
transferring technological idedb°is'a distinctive departure from the
more publcized, glamorous, "hawking" approaches. Goddard and NASA are
to be commended for this innovative and apparently successful strategy.
The Task Placed Before the Panel
The task which the panel has been asked to address is
to conduct an evaluation of the NASA/Baltimore Applications Project for
the Director, Goddard Space Flight 'Center (GSFC). The purposes of the
evaluation are five fold. They are tot (1) provide an independent and
objective evaluation of the achievements of the NASA/Baltimore Applica-
tions Project; (2) determine the extent to which the project's
objectives have been accomplished, (3) analyze and describe how the
project worked; (4) assess its applicability for a further period of
time in Baltimore, and its extension elsewhere; and (5) evaluate its
impact both upon the City of Baltimore and the Goddard Space Flight Center."
The principal thrust of the review has been to treat the BAP
as a true experiment,-and-to systematically describe and analyze what has
been learned from approximately 30 months of operation. Emphasis has
been placed on judging the extent to which it has been successful in
demonstrating a particular mode of technology transfer with subsequent
-5-
application and the extent to which such a mode of operation might be
applicable elsewhere.
tip ! In undertaking its review, the panel has followed the process
common to most Academy panel studies whereby the panel sets the study
objectives, providing clear guidance to staff for collecting data,
preparing.summary materials, and drafting working papers.
	 The report
represents the consensus of the panel with respect to findings and
recommendations. j
k
T
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Laying the Foundation for the Baltimore Applications Project
The headline in the New York Times read "NASA Consultant to
1/
the City is Finding Down-to-Earth Uses for Space Technology." 	 It
was this article that sparked ,interest within the Baltimore City Hall,
ultimately leading to the establishment of the Goddard /Baltimore
Applications Project. Mr. Robert C. Embry, Jr., Commissioner of the
Baltimore Department of Housing and Community Development, wrote to NASA
Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher, "We read with great interest of
NASA's relationship to New York City as explained in the Times of
October 13, 1973;.	 Baltimore would very much like to participate in
' such a program having a similar person assigned to work with us.
Would you please indicate who we might speak with to workout the details
2/
of such a program?"	 In dust over seven months, the Baltimore Ap-
lications Project came into, being with the ceremonial signing of a
k Memorandum of_Understanding on April 26, 1974 in Baltimore ' s City Hall.
Within two weeks, then Congressman Paul Sarbanes of Baltimore
had followed up Embry ' s initial letter with one of his own "urging prompt
response" to the Baltimore request.	 On November 21, Edward Gray,
Assistant Administrator for Industry Affairs and Technology Utilization,
gave a positive response to'Embry's inquiry, requesting that he contact
Mr. Jeffery Hamilton of the Technology Utilization Office, NASA Headquarters,
fora more detailed discussion of the possibilities. 	 Hamilton called the
l/	 New York Times, October 13, 1973.
2/	 Letter to R.C. Embry, Jr., to James C. Fletcher, October 16, 1973. 'l
PRECEDING
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Deputy Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center, Donald P. Hearth,
describing the Baltimore request and soliciting Goddard's interest in
participating in an arrangement similar to that with New York City.
Hearth asked Charles Boyle, Chief of the Special Projects Office, to
pursue this idea.further with Hamilton before any commitment was made.
By early December the Center's leadership decided to participate,
and the Center was represented at the first meeting of city and NASA
representatives on December 11, 1973. The meeting was held at the
Goddard Space Flight Center with senior Baltimore officials Robert Embry,
Pierce F. Linaweaver, Director of the Department of Public Works, and
Larf!y Reich, Director of Planning. The principal consideration was how.
a mutually satisfactory arrangement could be worked out. Enthusiasm
was high on both sides. Negotiations from the NASA side were being con-
ducted principally by representatives from the Technology Utilization
function--both in NASA Headquarters and at the Goddard Space Flight
Center. A second meeting was held, this time in Baltimore,on January 21,
	
3
1974 when Mayor William Donald Schaefer attended, accompanied by five
department heads. Embry continued to be the principal negotiator for
Baltimore. There was a general discussion of the possible relationships
between Goddard and Baltimore, a review of typical city problems, and
a general agreement that NASA should draft a Memorandum of:Understanding
and begin the process of selecting potential candidates to act as the
Goddard representatives in Baltimore. Donald Friedman and Charles Boyle
k	 of Goddard met with Embry, tentatively agreeing that the "technology
transfer agent" should be provided by NASA, with NASA paying the agent's
salary,that he should serve in the Mayor's Office, with Baltimore provid-
ing office space and necessary supporting services.	 Following the
meeting, Mayor Schaefer wrote to Hearth expressing his satisfaction with r	 ^,,
the meeting and pledging his continued support to the proposed project.
` Toward the end of the month Jack Peake, chief of the Office of
National Needs, was assigned by Hearth to work with Boyle to organize
K
the project and select the director. 	 During the next two months they f
drafted the Memorandum of Understanding for review by NASA and Baltimore
officials.	 The selection process formally began with a memorandum from
Hearth to all Goddard directors on March 13, 1974 requesting their
nominations of candidates for the position.
	
The final selection of the
director, Tom Golden, was made shortly before the final acceptance of
the Memorandum of Understanding.
	
The signing ceremony/press conference
was held in Baltimore on April 26, 1974.
	
Dr. John F. Clark,,Director,
signed for GSFC.
There were several circumstances which gave positive impetus
to the 'birth of the Baltimore Applications Protect. 	 First, NASA Head-
quarters encouraged the Center to participate in this project--without
placing any constraints upon how the Center might proceed.
	
From the
outset the Center was free to accept or to reject the idea of participating -
at all.
	 Second, the Administrator of NASA had been encouraging a
"technological outreach" of this nature.	 Just four days before the
signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, on April 22, 1974, the
-10-
Administrator sent a memorandum to the Directors of all NASA Field
Centers emphasizing the desirability of applying NASA's skills to
i
national needs. In addition, the Center leadership provided consider-
able positive interest and support throughout the working levels at
Goddard for undertaking this project. There was recognition that this
project represented something of a "risk" since it was not closely
related to NASA's fundamental space mission and, therefore, was viewed
in some mid-management quarters as a "competitor" for technical manpowerg	
^	
p	 p
and financial resources. Even a small incursion on primary resources was
viewed by-some as undesirable because Goddard (Like most other NASA Centers)
had been living for five or six years with tight personnel ceilings--indeed,
constant attrition accompanied by occasional reducations in force. How-
ever, these reservations were not serious enough to prevent the initiation
of the project.
Finally, one cannot overlook the significance of the close
relationship between Hearth and Peake during the formative period of the
BAP. Peake had responsibility for the BAP within his Office of National
Deeds; Hearth as Deputy Center Director, represented top management and
was solidly behind the project. Close daily contact provided an informal
opportunity to discuss virtually every.aspect of the project, including
its concept, organization, staffing, and other relationships from the
planning stage through most of the first 18 months of operation.
IGoals of the Baltimore Applications Project
The goals enunciated for the project in the Memorandum of
Understanding are clear, though general. 	 The memorandum states"
It is the policy of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration to encourage cooperative projects as a
means of facilitating and accelerating the transfer of
aerospace technology to public sector areas of concern.
Cooperating with the City of Baltimore, NASA agrees to
undertake a pilot project of an initial two-year duration
to test the feasibility and measure the effects,of utiliz-
ing technology in the solutions to problems that affect
the urban environment, generally, and the challenge to
^c public administrators of Baltimore, specifically. 	 3/
Perhaps more incisive insight into the goals of the BAP is
evident in the attitudes and expectations of those officials principally
involved in establishing the experiment--both at the Goddard Space Flight
Center and in the City of Baltimore. 	 Donald Hearth,who was •Deputy Director
at Goddard during the inception and early operation of the BAP, was the
principal policy official responsible for setting the tone for the
experiment, what should be accomplished, and the means by which those
goals should be approached.	 Hearth had four deeply held convictions
which generated considerable support for this activity and affected the
fundamental concepts underlying the BAP. 	 These were:	 (1) technology
can be an asset in dealing with many of society's problems, including
urban problems; (2) NASA, as an institution, is unique in the Federal
government sinceit has ten laboratories throughout the country con-
3/	 Basic Memorandum of Understanding, April 26, 1974.	 See Appendix B.
A subsequent, more detailed Memorandum of Understanding, which was
-completed on October 18, 1974, cites subsection 203 (b) of National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 247 (b) as
the authority for establishing.the RAP.
-12-
stituting unusual talent pools of highly qualified technical and manage-
ment people; (3) NASA researchers and technologists are also public
servants, but more perceive themselves as scientists or engineers, not
as public servants; and (4) there is a great communications or perception
problem both within NASA and. outside in the sense that there is a failure
to understand that NASA's responsibilities go beyond aerospace and that
the public has an inadequate understanding of how NASA works or the
4 /
nature of its talent pool.
Hearth was explicitly clear about the fundamental concept for
the BAP, and he communicated this unmistakably to those at Goddard
assigned to organize the project. In his view, the idea from the
beginning was to experiment with how to transfer technology--not how
to sell it--with the principal emphasis upon having Goddard act as a
technical resource for the City of Baltimore. Those involved in initiat-
ing the project were aware of similar efforts on the part of the National
Science Foundation and of Public Technology Incorporated, but they
believed that the BAP represented a different mode for technology transfer
.	
a
which merited testing. [In fact, the BAP did represent a new mode, which
a
in a somewhat different context, was about to be tested by Public Technology
Incorporated through a new program sponsored by the National Science Founda-
tion. This new program, named the Urban Technology System, was also
experimental, aimed at placing over two dozen "technology agents" in
cities of various sizes throughout the United States. The UTS Program
4/ From the discussion at the first panel meeting, July 26', ,` 197-at the
Coddard Space Flight Center. It should be noted that Donald Hearth
moved from CSFC to become the Director, NASA Langley Research Center
in December, 1975.
e.c . J
was just starting, shortly after the Memorandum of Understanding was
signed between GSFC and the City of Baltimore.] Hearth viewed the BAP
as supplemental to NASA's long standing technology utilization efforts,
not competitive with it.
Hearth ' s view on the underpinning philosophy of the BAP was
faithfully reflected in the day-to-day project development of activities
undertaken by Jack Peake and Charles Boyle. As they talked about the.-
nature of the qualifications for the project director, and later con- ^i
ducted extensive interviews with potential candidates, the concept was-
fleshed out.. The approach was to be premised on the general method of
"technology pull" from Baltimore to NASA, where mutual trust and under-
standing were to be developed between the technical agent (that is, the
BAP project director) and working officials in the City of Baltimore who
would identify their particular problems, then cooperatively search for
possible alternative solutions. The choice of technology which might be
F
	 applied was to be the city official's choice and the problems were those
of the particular department or agencies involved. This meant that
i
the technology agent was to be more of a coordinator or facilitator
than a typical project director, i.e. he was to be a technological
resource and not,a . manager or implementor of technology._ Although
specific applications of technology (and hopefully some applications of
aerospace technology) were expected, these were not to be the principal
objectives of the project. Rather, BAP
-
was viewed more as an experiment
or demonstration project by which to determine if a city could use the
technology agent in the role of a "technologist in residence."
_	 I
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The project's originators at Goddard were convinced, based upon their
own observations of the transfer process, as well as extensive discussions
°
with others, that this experiment should test, in a limited environment,
the value of "technology pull" in contrast to the more frequently used j
"technology push. "* The process of application was never intended to be
limited to that which originated only in NASA or the aerospace industry.
A prime objective of the Baltimore Applications Project
is the determination of how technology can be utilized
in helping the departments in the City of Baltimore to
more efficiently, effectively and beneficially carryout
their tasks.	 5/
Quite apart from learning about a different process for technology
application, the project originators did expect some benefits to flow to
Goddard and to NASA. For example, it was expected that the involvement
of GSFC personnel in this project would given them an additional "sense
of accomplishment", and that it might also improve the technological
versatility of those who participated. Although the BAP was not a
conscious effort to diversify Goddard's project activity, it might serve
in a small way, as an example of the potential opportunities in the ex-
panded use of technology which were postulated to exist. In addition,
it was.anticipated that Goddard, as an institution, would become better
f	 known in Baltimore and its environs because of this direct public service.
F
Also, it should provide_a number of new linkages outside the traditional
G
5/ Tom Golden, Second Quarterly Progress Report, January, 1975.
"Technology pull" is commonly used to describe--customer or potential
user demand for new technological solut rcs; 'technology push" describes
the phenomemon where the principa ctor is the technology discoverer
_	 (or a third party) who has
	 technology in hand and presses for its
use.
0I . 	[	 1	 1	 {	 I	 i
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aerospace community, and Goddard personnel could expand their technical
perspectives from their experiences in dealing with specific problems
k	 in Baltimore.
Baltimore officials who helped give birth to the BAP or who
were among the first to have considerable contact with the technology
agent (Tom Golden) in suggesting tasks which might be undertaken, had
similar perceptions or expectations about the project. In their view,
	
f:	 the purpose was to help the city address some of its problems through
azF
improved and/or a::panded application of technology (again not limited
	
t	 to NASA or aerospace technology). The technology agent was conceived of
r
as a modern day "county extension agent" who was a technologist with his
fingers on research and development across the Federal government, able
and willing to help city officials in diagnosing problems and sorting
out technology which might be applicable.: Both parties anticipated
"practical assistance." The project was considered valuable to NASA
as another means of demonstrating the expanded utility of NASA's primary
6/
concern--aerospace research and development.
a
k, Project-Organization and Guidelines
Hearth decided to place the Baltimore Applications Project in
Jack Peake's Office of AST/SRT_National Needs Office.	 Peake's office
6/ From interviews with city officials, July-October, 1976 and from the
	
k	 Second Panel Meeting, September 17, 1976 in Baltimore, Maryland. 	 -r
7/ The AST refers to Aeronautics and Space Technology, the SRT to Supporting
Research and Technology--two categories of "general support" funds which
headquarters allocates l to'NASA Field Centers on a project basis permit-
ting activities on the initiative of the various Centers and their
divisions. The Goddard Office of Technology Utilization was located in
the Administration and Management Directorate under Special Programs.
Later this function was transferred to the Office of AST/SRT National Needs.
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was located in the Engineering Directorate which has jurisdiction over
the largest number (and perhaps the greatest variety) of engineers at
the Center. Hearth reasoned that successful "linking" between NASA
technical competence and Baltimore's problems were more likely if the
effort was administered from Goddard's principal engineering organiza-
tion rather than from another location. No written policy was ever
issued from the Director's Office to Peake laying out specific
responsibilities or authority. Peake and the BAP project director
operated, essentially, free from any bureaucratic restraints, reporting
progress/problems informally from time to time to Hearth, and issuing
quarterly and annual reports to inform Goddard management, Baltimore
officials, and other interested parties of progress. [It should be
recalled that from the time Peake was first brought into this activity
in January, 1974 until Hearth left the Center in December, 1.975, they
were in continual, if informal, communication.]
The selection of the right kind of individual as project
i
director was viewed as a key to the success of the project. Boyle and
Peake labored for the better part of a month in sorting out guidelines
i
for candidate selection and in the actual search and selection process.
E	 A two and one half page "job profile" was put together by Boyle and
C
t
Peake as a basis for directingtheir search and for evaluating potential
candidates. Some of the abilities listed were: analyze/evaluate, organize/
set priorities/plan, build relationships/make friendships, convince/
persuade, and speak/communicate. Ultimately, the formal position description
described the project director's qualifications as:
3
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The personal qualifications of the incumbent are of
paramount importance. He must possess current knowledge
of NASA and the federal establishment, general technical
skills, active imagination, and natural ability to work
cooperatively with Baltimore City officials and citizens
in pursuit of project goals. He will interface with
city employees of all levels and with various citizens
from civic organizations, business and industry. He will
meet the public in a variety of settings, including speak-
ing engagements and news interviews. 8/
The initial list of candidates was obtained in three ways.
First, Boyle and Peake listed whom they thought might be potential
candidates. Second, many heard by word of mouth about the BAP and
asked to be considered for the position. Third, Hearth sent a memorandum
to all directors at GSFC requesting nominees. Hearth attached to his
memorandum a description of the project, its location, the nature of
the job, general qualifications, and
 the assurance that this job would
receive continuing top level concern and support . . .
The job of Director, TTP, is regarded as a developmental
career opportunity.
	 The continuing personal interest of
the Goddard Deputy Director will help ensure that the
necessary administrative and technical support from NASA
will be provided whenever problem solution efforts require
help from our discipline areas.
	 9/
Boyle and Peake received nearly 100 names to consider from these
various sources.	 During the preliminary screening process, Peake and
Boyle relied principally on personal knowledge of the candidates.
	 They
sought qualities of flexibility and adaptability as well as breadth of
technical background and experience.
	 They talked with supervisors and
8/	 NASA position record number E2292, Goddard Space Flight Center, AST
Technology Utilization 770-40, dated May 14, 1974.
9/ ,Memorandum to all directors [GSFC] from Donald P. Hearth, Deputy Director,
Subject:
	 NASA/Baltimore Applications Project, dated March 13, 1974.
Z
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peers, consulted personnel folders and came up with approximately a
dozen candidates for intensive interview. Interviews were unstructured,
but generally encompassed a statement as to what was perceived to be
the nature of the requirements of the job, inqrLries about the candidates'
views of the job, and questions to elicit the nature and /or extent of
the candidates' motivation and interest. Peake and Boyle separately
f
f
rated the candidates on interest, personal traits, technical ability,
related experience, and recommendations. They then compared notes and
resolved differences in their ratings. The choice was narrowed to six
candidates. Special attention was given to the motivation, with the
remaining six candidates asked to participate in a structured exercise
called SIMA (System for Identification of Motivated Abilities) which
provided more objective data for judging motivation. Boyle and Peake
ranked the final four candidates, recommending Tom Golden for the job.
Hearth concurred, and Tom Golden was appointed as the Director of the
Baltimore Applications Project.
r
	
	
As noted above, aside from the Memorandum of Understanding, there
was no formal policy or program guidance issued from either the Director's
Office at GSFC or from the Office of -the Mayor in,Baltimore on how the
technology agent was to pursue the BAP goals. At Goddard, there was
clear, if informal, understanding from Hearth to both Peake and Golden
.	
i
about the nature and modus operandi of the BAY. Golden was to work
pragmatically without specific guidelines, keeping Peake and Hearth
informed about progress on the project, and avoiding establishing
bureaucratic ."procedures." Apart from the televised press conference
-19
in the Baltimore City Hall at the time of the signing of the Memorandum
of Understanding by the Mayor and the Director of Goddard, there was
little overt publicity about the project. Both Goddard and city
officials (principally Hearth, Peake, Golden and Berkowitz from Baltimore)l
x
concurred that the project should maintain a "low profile" to avoid
raising undue expectations early in the project's life and to avoid
"over-selling" what might be accomplished. It was believed that this
approach would provide greater flexibility for the project at the ;outset
as well as insuring better access to city agencies by Golden,_alloiding
an appearance that he was expected to be a "technological messiah."_
Although not shunning publicity, this "low profile" carried several
advantages to Goddard: first, avoiding the perception that the Center's
principal interest in the project was as a public relations gimmick, and
second, not to draw undue attention to a project which fell outside the
ambit of Goddard's primary mission of aerospace research and development.
Getting Started
Mr. Bernard Berkowitz, the Mayor's Coordinator for physical
Development, was formally designated as the Baltimore City official to
act on behalf of the Mayor in the Baltimore Applications Project.
Office space and secretarial support would be provided, facilitating'
a close working relationship between Golden and Berkowitz. Golden
found Berkowitzextraordinarily helpful in introducing him to Baltimore
City government. From the beginning, Golden was invited to sit with the
E
€	 Mayor's Cabinet for Physical Development which includes the Departments
1 
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of Economic Development, Finance, Housing and Community Development,
Planning, Public Works, Recreation and Parks, and Transit and Traffic.
In this way Golden was able to keep in close touch with the kind of
issues and problems being brought to the attention of the Mayor. It
also presented Golden with the opportunity, on a weekly basis, to
become more personally familiar with the heads of those departments
	 `!
where he was most likely to be asked for assistance.
Very early in the project Golden and Berkowitz conducted a
series of free-ranging discussions from which it became possible to
make a conceptual separation of the various organizations in the city
into "intensive" and "non-intensive" categories with respect to likely
application of NASA technology. The categorization was as follows:
a
Intensive	 Less or Not Intensive 	 i
Education	 Assessments
Fire
	 Audits	 i
Health	 Comptroller
Hospital
	 Economic Development
Housing and Community Development
	 Finance
Planning
	 Law
Police
	 Legislative Reference
Public Works
	 Postmortem Examiners
Recreation and Parks	 Real Estate
Transit and Traffic
	 Social Services
Treasurer
Golden proceeded to arrange for appointments with the heads of
the departments in the "technologically intensive" category.: This gave
him an opportunity to discuss on an informal_ basis the nature and goals
of the project, how he hoped to operate, and a chance to become better
acquainted on a personal basis. It also offered the initial opportunity
a-21-
F	 to begin exploring the kinds of problems- -as seen from the department's
f	
viewpoint--which might be considered for possible technological
assistance.
A specific effort was made at each encounter not to suggest
	 a
in any way that 'NASA has a solution to the problem,,so
what is your problem'?	 Only at the end of each encounter
was'NASA or other Federally sponsored technology mentioned.
Literature covering the public-oriented'' technology programs
sponsored by the NASA Technology Utilization Office was
left with the Department Head for him to peruse at his
leisure..	 The encounter hopefully left the Department Head
with the idea that we are sincerely searching for identifica-
tion and definition of his problems out of which might come
one or more means of solution through NASA know-how.
	 10/
Golden carefully
	 ollowed this "low-key" approach in each of hisY	 Y	 PP 
y^
contacts, seeking to leave the impression that his role was to be as a
technology	 esource not as a techno logy salesman.
	 This was the process.
used for identifying potential tasks under the project.
	 The Department
Head was the key level for determination of what the problems were and
the priority in which they should be approached.
	 To the extent that
there appeared to be any type of conflict among projects or in priorities
between departments, requiring Golden to work more urgently upon onethan
another, that determination was made in consultation with the Mayor's
Coordinator for Physical Development, Bernard, Berkowitz.
	 Up to August,
1974, Golden identified 49 different task areas with which Baltimore
City officials wished assistance.
	 For each task Golden identifieda
contact in the Baltimore City government (usually at the bureau chief
or higher--i.e. Department--level), and a specific member of the Goddard
10/	 Baltimore Applications Project, Interim Progress Report, August, 1974,
Page 9
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staff responsible for coordinating Goddard participation (or participation
by other agencies, as required).
After only three months, Golden began to feel the pressure of
I
dealing with a wide variety of topics, requiring considerable assistance.
He noted,
If effective technology transfer and.utilization are to	 j
occur a strategy must be determined or regime be established
for providing additional participants and adequate time 	 i
for their participation if we are to work effectively
with the .	 . Baltimore City counterparts. 11/
This was to be a continuous challenge--developing a broad network of 	 j
1
I,
contacts, extending beyond NASA, which could be brought to bear on
Baltimore problems. Rarely was there reluctance among Goddard people
to take part; and when there.was it resulted from conflicting priorities
rather than lack of interest.
ll/ Ibid. p. 28.
k
,H
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Chapter III	 -
The Baltimore Applications Project in Operation
Not apparent amid the glare of T.V. floodlights illuminating
the ceremonial signing of the Memorandum of Understanding were three
factors which, for the , most'part, helped ensure a successful beginning
to the Baltimore Applications Project. These were: (1) a congenial
environment, (2) a relatively low-risk modusoRerandi, and (3) optimistic,
if somewhat amorphous expectations.
The Environment
The environment surrounding the project was positive. The
 project enjoyed top-level support both in Baltimore and at Goddard; it
reflected a positive "image" as representative of NASA, and it found
unusual receptivity in Baltimore. First, the Mayor of Baltimore,
William Donald Schaefer, was convinced that the BAP could do many good
things for. the City of Baltimore; this was reinforced by the strong
encouragement of one of his principal cabinet members Robert Embry,
Commissioner for Housing and Community Development. The Mayor assigned
one of his top assistants, Bernard Berkowitz, Physical 'Development
Coordinator, as the Baltimore City official responsible for the project.
P	
The selection of Berkowitz was especially fortuitous since he was
politically knowledgeable and professionally respected, providing an
ideal "buffer" between the technology agent (Golden) andthe top
9	 political level, without inhibiting the communications. The Director
r	 Y
I- 	t	 I	 1	 I	 1	 i	 1
I
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of Goddard, Dr. John Clark, strongly supported the BAP as an experiment;
he was seconded by his Deputy, Donald Hearth, who had a strong interest
in seeing the project succeed and who was prepared to exercise the
authority of the Director's office to encourage support and cooperation
throughout the Center. The close, informal, relationship between Hearth
and Jack Peake's office, where the Goddard responsibility for BAP resided,
was continuously reinforced. Finally, in selecting Tom Golden as the
first technology agent to conduct the BAP, they had selected-an individual
of unusual sensitivity, ready and able to develop rapport and to reflect
the technical competence of Goddard in a fashion inviting positive
response.
Second, NASA enjoyed the image of a successful, well-managed,
high technology agency,.with an outstanding 'record of achievement. In
addition, it was a "neutral" agency since it sponsored no programs and
did not enforce any regulations having significant impact (at least of
a direct nature) upon cities. In this operational sense, Baltimore
officials had little knowledge about NASA (or Goddard) except what
they read in the newspapers, and their brief exposure in developing
the Memorandum of Understanding. The image with which the BAP "opened 	 3
for business" was a =positive, successful one.
Third, apart from all else, there was a favorable receptivity
to the BAP in Baltimore. Baltimore had something of a "heritage" for
technical and other innovations throughout its history.' For example,
it established the first Department of Public Health in the United States
_a
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in 1793; the first gaslight used to light either a room or street corner
was located ' in Baltimore in 1802; it was the site of the first steam car
(1830) and the first, direct, transatlantic steamship service (1838); it
^ad the first. College of Dental Surgery (1839), and was the origin of
the first successful ' demonstration of the telegraph (1844); it also
pioneered in electric street cars (1885) and has been recognized for
more than . 75 years as a leader in the planning and operation of municipal
water services. A half dozen of the Mayor's key cabinet members were in-
volved in the discussions leading to the Memorandum of Understanding,
and 'several of these, prior to the signing of the Memorandum, had already
i	 begun considering possible tasks to bring before the technology agent
I
	 upon his arrivial in Baltimore.
BAP Modus Operandi
It was more or less agreed among Hearth, Peake, and Golden that
Golden would follow a relatively simple four-step approach in working
on the various tasks that came before the Baltimore Applications Project.
He would depend upon city officials to identify their problems, would
search for additional data to better illuminate the problem or potential
solutions, screen irrelevant bits and pieces, aggregate data in a form
suitable for his ' clients, and continue whatever assistance proved nec-
essary, as requested, until the task was completed or dropped. With
each of these steps, Golden was guided by a series of deeply held but informal
operating rules. In searching out-the problems, he was to keep a low
.,	 b
rtn
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l
profile, avoiding "political" problems, particularly during the initial
period of the project. In searching for more data on the problems/
solutions he was to use every resource possible, making it clear to
those with whom he worked in Baltimore that the BAP was not to be limited
to the NASA technology competence.* Tn screening the resulting feedback
data, and either presenting it or arranging for presentation to appropriate
officials, Golden was to avoid pressing for particular solutions. He
was careful to avoid NASA (or other governmental) competition with com-
mercial sources so that when a particular service or piece of hardw d
was "commercially available" he tended to withdraw from f her active
participation in the task. Finally, after presen ng the information for
possible management decision, he bowed o of the picture unless requested
to remain--retaining a low, unob usive profile and studiously staying out
of the "decision-making" ain.
Expectations
From Baltimore's viewpoint, NASA technology (as represented by
the BAP) was welcomed with open arms. It was anticipated that NASA
could help by applying its "space-age" technology. Presumably, the
city would be better off for it, becoming a more efficient, effective
city because of NASA applications. There was also some belief extant
* To some extent it might be considered presumptive of NASA to act
as general interpreter to Baltimore for all Federal technology, but
this was the role played by Golden. NASA does have a primary (and
explicit) charge for technology transfer in the Space Act of 1958,
Section 203_(a) (3). NASA's Regional Dissemination Centers have
access to most Federally-sponsored technology, with NASA constituting
only-30 per cent of their files.
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among officialdom that act	 participation in the BAP would be further
demonstration of a "progressiveness" of Baltimore. From the Goddard
viewpoi , NASA officials anticipated a series of opportunities for
-oddard technological competence to be brought to bear, bringing favorable
E
irecognition (perhaps some newsworthy publicity) as well as the benefits
from having a number of its scientists and engineers participate actively
in the solution of city problems (giving them some social visibility,
acclaim, and technical stimulation).
All of these things augured well for a most successful project,
benefiting both the City of Baltimore and the Goddard Space Flight Center.
Summary of Tasks Undertaken
During the nearly 30 months from thesigning of the Memorandum.
of Understanding (April 1974) to the 1976 Fall Progress Report, 69
12/
tasks have been activated under the Baltimore Applications Project.
Sixteen different departments or agencies in Baltimore have been involved
in one or more tasks, ranging up to 22 different taks in which the
Department of Public Works has participated. 	 See Appendix C.	 As
might be expected, enthusiasm for the project is closely related to
the depth of involvement an agency, and its officials have had with
the BAP.	 Most
	
officials of the Baltimore Department of Public WorksJr
1
i who were interviewed praised Golden and the BAP, and gave strong
i
support for the continuation of the project.
12/	 This is at least a close approximation.- The best sources for
identifying tasks are the Interim of Annual Reports; however,`
tasks may be merged from one reporting period to another, dropped
without furthercomment, or recast.
i
.	
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Early in the project, Golden categorized tasks according to
three types of activity: (1) consultation and advisory, (2) technology
demonstrations, and (3) research and development programs. The first
i
category described those tasks involving data collection, synthesis or 	 all
some analysis, identifying sources of advice or assistance, and providing
advice. The second category covers actual demonstrations of technology--
i
whether of a short "show and tell" variety or a longer duration experi-
mental use of ,some technology. The third category was reserved for those
tasks that required laboratory work, perhaps of up to a year's duration.
Of the 69 tasks, 52 can be classified as advisory or consultative in 	 1
nature, 14 were wholly or at least partly technology demonstrations,
and four were principally research and development tasks. For example,
the high temperature paint task involved putting appropriate Public Works
officials in touch with a Goddard engineer who advised them on available
specialty paints for high temperature application. Once the information
was made available, the BAP task was completed and the Department proceeded
to obtain the paint and use it satisfactorily.
The "Probeye" and "air breathing apparatus" tasks exemplify
technology demonstration of the "show and tell" variety. Golden arranged,
through NASA Technology Utilization channels, for manufacturers of these
new equipments to conduct demonstrations for Fire Department personnel
at a convenient time and place so they could receive instructions and
actually handle the equipment. Once the demonstrations took place, Golden
and the BAP bowed out. A different example of technology demonstration
x{9
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5
was a series of tests, on cement mixers and salt spreaders, of a corrosion	 x.
resistant zinc-based paint provided by GSFC for test use by the Depart-
ment of Public Works. The paint was applied and . an evaluation is in
process.	 x
An example of an R&D task is that of heavy metals detection to
monitor ' their relative concentration in water. After some searching, it
was determined that current instrumentation is inadequate; a Goddard
researcher, pursuing research relevant to solar and astrophysics, began
doing applied work which should yield new instruments capable of detecting
minute traces of heavy metals on a continuous basis.
I
	
w
Of the 47 tasks considered "completed," the vast majority--
39--fall in the "advisory and consultative "category, six in technology
demonstration, and two in research and development. This should not be
i
	
	 surprising given the nature and goals of the BAP--to respond to
technological needs as determined by city officials, and to provide
a source of technological competence.
,
About half of the tasks have involved NASA technology and
Goddard personnel other than those directly resuonsible for the BAP.
This is an unusually high proportion given the fact that information was
sought wherever it might be for problems defined by city officials.
j
Mini-Cases--How the BAP Actually Worked
f	 Since it was not possible to explore in detail all 69 tasks,
I	 ^
	 five were selected for examination in depth to illuminate the nature of
C	
_.
I.
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involvement, both in Baltimore and at Goddard, and to illustrate the
considerable serendipity which operated in this experiment of "user-
pull" process.* Each of the mini-cases is more fully described in
Appendix D.
Very early in the life of the BAP, Golden was asked to
investigate how "waste heat" at the city incinerators might be recovered
for secondary use. Goddard had conducted a number of successful applica-
tions in heat pipe technology for balancing heat loads in spacecraft,
and numerous other applications had been made of the technology. Golden
therefore asked those involved at the Goddard Facilities Engineering
Division to take the leadership. The group was eager to test advanced
technology it had under development contract, and proceeded to visit
Baltimore for a review and for meetings with city engineers. A delay
in the Goddard heat pipe development program meant that its application
in Baltimore would have to await another opportunity; however, the
Goddard people had caught the spirit of the project, so they shifted
their attention to how more conventional technology might be brought
to bear. An engineering consulting firm, already under contract with
Goddard, was asked to produce a thermal model of Baltimore's Pulaski
incinerator as the basis for determining the feasibility of using steam
generated by the incinerator heat. The study was nearly a year in pro-
cess, providing data showing that several promising alternatives were
uneconomical. There remained the possibility that electricity could
The cases are not "representative" in a statistical sampling sense,
they do _demonstrate the breadth of topics undertaken:
.%. I
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be generated at the incinerator to meet 100 percent of plant needs while
producing some surplus. This feasibility depends on working out an
arrangement with the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company. Here, when
timing precluded the application of high technology, Goddard participants
merely shifted to more conventional methods to respond to the client's
needs.
The "Data Collection Platform" task became a demonstration of
NASA technology previously used in a worldwide data collection experiment
on oceanography and atmospheric investigations linked via satellite
communications. Here, Golden, prompted by a colleague at Goddard, sug-
gested that Water Supply Division officials consider this instrument
system as an interesting supplemental experiment to their exploratory
use of Landsat imagery as one means for determining various conditions
of their reservoirs and watersheds. Exploratory discussions further
revealed that the data collection platforms could enhance considerably
a large aeration demonstration for which the Division was seeking a
i	
grant from the Environmental Protection Agency. The instruments were
loaned by NASA Wallops Station, with technical instruction provided by
both Wallops and Goddard personnel. Although the instruments are not
fully adaptable to the application, they can provide adequate data on
at least four key water quality parameters of interest. The instruments
are in place at the Lock Raven Reservoir and the initial data is being
received, with calibration, adjustment, and data analysis. The technical
demonstration, though only in its initial stages, has generated considerable
-32-
interest at both Goddard and in Baltimore for more develo pment work
in instrument technology to measure fresh water conditions, and in
other applications of the platform, in conjunction with satellite
communications, to Baltimore water quality monitoring and water supply
operations. Economic feasibility has yet to be tested. Here is an
excellent example of the synergism possible when technology sparks
innovation through application, to generate another stimulus for
technical advance and further application.
When Golden was asked to take up the task of improved insect
(roach) control in Baltimore public housing, he quickly contacted
t several acquaintances in the Agriculture Research Service--ultimately
finding an extension entymologist at the University of Maryland. The
entymologist was put in touch with the appropriate officials in
Baltimore, and as progress was reported over the next year, Golden
declared the task completed in September 1975. In a sense this was
true; through the BAP, resource (the entymologist) had been brought
to bear on the problem. The BAP had performed a consultant or advisory
role; However, the entymologist was busy training the control crew,
demonstrating new techniques and new chemical agents. He discovered
i	 that a variety of factors appeared to be converging to produce, possibly,
E
a roach immune to most known pesticides. He developed plans for conduct
i ing research along with continuing demonstration, but recently appeared
prp
E	 blocked by a classic Problem in oreanizational behavior--second level
ed.- A
t{
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E'
subordinates become frustrated at the resistance to change (which
they perceive as correct)--both demonstration and potential research
may be stopped. Here the relatively straight forward application of
current technology had unexpected (though not unpredictable) organiza-
tional results. It also led to a technical discovery thereby stimulating
further, probably important, research of potentially wide application.
.In July 1976, the Baltimore Department of Health conducted a
management workshop at which the agency leadership and a representative
group of employees met to mutually explore what the goals of the Depart-
ment ought to be, and how to organize to meet them. This was considerably
removed from the progenitor activity--discussions between Golden and the
City's Director of Telecommunications on how to demonstrate practical
telecommunications applications that might be used in city departments.
It was agreed, after discussion with the Commissioner of Health that
such a demonstration, in that department, should be the subject of a
workshop, bringing together user requirements and technical system
descriptions with Goddard personnel acting as "facilitators." Further
discussions revealed that "user requirements" could hardly be defined
since many organizational questions remained open--including possible
changes in the way the Department defined its mission. The workshop
opened a new dialogue in the Health Department with a potential for
organizational revitalization--with or without new applications of
technology.
There is one area where Golden clearly has given technology
a firm "nudge" instead of awaiting "user pull"--and that is in the area
--
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of potential applications of solar energy. He was largely responsible
for stimulating city interest in five separate tasks for solar energy
use. Golden, with the assistance of Goddard engineers, arranged for
consultants, specialists from industry, experts from Federal agencies,
and others to provide briefings to various city officials at different
times. The overall purpose was to acquaint officials with the potential,
the state of the art, and practical considerations in the use of solar
energy for space heating and cooling, and domestic hot water heating.
Three serious efforts were made to obtain Federal grant funds for
demonstration projects, one of which was successful, creating considerable
interest and goodwill. Each of these efforts required bringing together
city officials, architect/engineer consultants, and representatives from
	 1
industry to join in the development and submission of a proposal. Here
is an example of technological "consciousness-raising", helping city
officials to become conversant with a new energy application and to
learn the rudiments of how to get what they want and need as purchasers
a
of new technology,.
Participation in the BAP and Reaction
a
Pa-_ticipation in Baltimore reached deepest into the Departments
of Public Works and of Housing and Community Development. Among the
others it tended to be Limited to the top two or three levels. Fully
one-third of the tasks are being conducted in the Department of Public
Works, where enthusiasm for the project is the highest. Senior officials
1
fi
I
I
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in the Police, Planning, Health, and Fire Departments appreciate the
j
"consultant" role of Golden--all work well with him and view him as
an asset.	 The Director of Public Works and a senior official of
Housing and Community Development periodically engage Golden in ...
r
'brainstorming" sessions, looking tb future problems and opportunities.
k
Few others had such extensive contact with Golden, and he has not made
it a practice to initiate periodic exchanges with department heads in
the absence of a request from them.
	 This combined with the "low
visibility" of the project, does not facilitate systematic consideration
of technology in the problem-solving process among the less involved
departments.
At Goddard, about 60 people have had involvement with the I
BAP.	 It varies from a single consultation to months of research or
development.
	 Whatever the involvement, it seems to generate unusual
enthusiasm and a genuine desire to be useful to Baltimore officials.
Little evidence has been found of "technological arrogance" which
limits receptiveness to technology transfer.
Some institutional factors at Goddard appear to hinder the full
impact of the project. 	 For example, in the "fire station location" task,- 4:-
Goddard was to make a supplemental input, but the _work lagged because of
i the BAP priority was insufficient to complete the task
The JHU [Johns Hopkins University] work is nearing_ completion.
It presently appears that the GSFC program because of relative
C priorities cannot be completed in time to significantly in-
fluence the outcome of the JHU work.
	 Because of his personal
interest in the subject,. Mr.	 [GSFC employee] will continue
y
r
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his work with the program on a lower priority basis. The 	 1
task is otherwise dropped from the active list. 13/
A related problem is the reluctance of Goddard scientists and engineers
to be involved in the BAP for any substantial amount of time to avoid
being identified with a secondary rather than a primary aerospace NASA
mission--thus becoming possible prime targets for the next reduction
in force when agency employment is being cut. This is a concern
which the panel believes to be legitimate, suggesting the desirability
of more formal status for the project at GSFC. Although provision has
been made for time to be charged against the BAP as a distinct financial
management project number, considerable time expended by GSFC staff
appears not to be reflected in the formal accounting system. Unfortunately,
this prevents any reasonable estimate of the project's cost to Goddard.
The BAP is publicized from time to time via local Goddard notices, but
it is not perceived to have substantial top-level support as a priority
Goddard activity. Thus Golden and Peake have had to take the burden
of convincing colleagues that it is legitimate and valuable for them
to assist with the appropriate BAP tasks. But the fact that the BAP
is not perceived to have top-level support reduces the incentive of
many Goddard employees to become involved in it.
l
1
j
13/ Interim Progress Report, March 1976, p.-4.
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Chapter IV
Findings and Recommendations
Clearly,	 champions for specific products there may be.
But what are needed are 	 'champions'--or rather 'advocates'--
of technology transfer as a process.	 These are individuals
who are not product--but process-oriented.	 1/
The Nature of the Evaluation
The task presented to the panel called for an " 	 objective
evaluation of the achievements of the NASA/Baltimore Applications Pro-
ject	 ."	 In recent years there has been an increasing tendency to
identify the term "objective" solely with those assessment processes
based upon numerical analysis.	 The panel rejects the notion that any
assessment other than a numercial or statistical analysis is less than
an objective evaluation. 	 In this case, both the nature of the BAP
"experiment" and the lack of data which would facilitate a numerical
analysis precluded this methodology as a principal means upon which
to base the panel's evaluation. 	 What the panel has done is to systematize
the written data and oral testimony, applying its judgment and experience
in terms of the guidelines available. 	 Therefore, the panel believes
that "objectivity" is fulfilled by a third party assessment (that is
i the panel) systematically applying a judgmental rationale to the data
available and arriving at consensus judgments.
In the assessment process, the first task was to determine the
rationale which should be applied. The starting point necessarily was
l/ Lambright, W. Henry and Albert H. Teich (Principal Investigators),
Federal Laboratories and.Technology Transfer: Institutions, Linkages,
and Processes, March 1974, RDI Report No. 18,'prepared for the National
Science Foundation, pp. A-12, A--13.
i
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the set of objectives or goals which the BAP sought to meet. These
objectives were stated in the Memorandum of Understanding between
Goddard and Baltimore, but were not extensively developed and precisely
specified. In addition, the panel perceived that some shift had occurred
during the course of the BAP project, in those goals. Therefore, the
panel's retrospective delineation of what constitutes the objectives/
goals of the Baltimore Applications Project probably is more explicit
than the combination of general goals defined in the Memorandum of
Understanding and those which existed in the heads of the principal
participants at Goddard and Baltimore when the agreement was signed.
Another question involved in establishing the evaluative
framework had been whose goals to use in judging--those of Goddard or
Baltimore? It should be recalled that Goddard had goals both for itself
and for Baltimore, but these did not necessarily fully represent
Baltimore' goals for the W. The panel decided to review the project's
achievements in terms of: (1) Goddard objectives, then (2) Baltimore
objectives--making these as explicit as possible. In addition, the
panel added a third category of objectives which never were explicit
in the documentation, but which were implicit by the very existence
of the project--that is, third party or the public's stake in the pro-
j'ect.
Next, the panel sought to develop indicators which could be
used to judge relative goal achievement. A tempting indicator was the
number of "hits" or technology applications actually put in place.
This can be characterized as "product orientation" where the principal
focus is on utilization rather than the transfer of technology. 	 In
its report on technology transfer and utilization, a committee of the
National Academy of Engineering made this distinction between the two:
Technology transfer--The process of collection, documentation
and'successful dissemination of scientific and technical
information to a receiver through a number of mechanisms,
both formal and informal, passive and active.
Technology utilization--The process through which government
research and technology is transformed into processes, pro-
ducts or services that can be applied to actual or potential
public or private needs. 	 It may also mean the secondary or
horizontal application of a technology that has been developed
for a particular mission, and, after modification and diversifica-
=- tion, fills a different need in another environment.	 2/
The selection of the "user-pull" strategy clearly put the emphasis on a
transfer type of activity, subordinating "product" as a principal measure
of goal achievement.	 The transfer concept places greater or even primary
emphasis on the process by which technology is diffused. 	 In fact, the
emphasis upon the BAP as a "pilot" project and as a "experiment" in the
Memorandum of Understanding focused attention on learning more about
the process by which either transfer or utilization is achieved. Here,
the focus was on "learning" both by Baltimore officials and by Goddard
staff. The general role played by the project director (Tom Golden),
as perceived by him and accepted by Baltimore officials, emphasized
the transfer process rather than the utilization process.
2/ National Academy of Engineering, Technology Transfer and Utilization
Recommendations for Re-directing the Emphasis and Correcting the Im-
balance (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Engineering), February,
1974, pp. 4-5.
f
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Among these roles are several that seems to stand out.
Because of the technology pull emphasis the earliest
role has been that of problem seeker and problem
identifier. Once contact with the department was
established, interviews were conducted which probed
insofar as possible into the set of problems the inter-
viewer felt to be important. Insight into where to go
to get information on possible solutions was necessary
so the next role became one of information gatherer or
agent.	 there are other roles that have been played.
These fall into the advisory category	 .. Others are
akin to the role of ombudsman . . . The Director has been
in the.role of a grantsman. . . On many occasions the
part of technology assessor has been required. Some
of these events.
	 have entailed recommendations
against incorporation of certain technology. Other
tasks have involved a role as an active 'doer' of
a task. . . and sometimes as a ' doer watcher' . . . 3/
There was an unavoidable tendency for the panel to adopt a
product orientation during the evaluation. This was resisted for two
reasons
	 (1) the explicit indication among the participants that
technology transfer was the purpose of the experiment, and (2) a
recognition by the panel of the desirability of using multiple indicators
in evaluating the success of the project. The main difficulty was finding
substitute indicators for the more traditional technology applications
approach when one is to judge the relative achievement of a process
oriented project. A nagging question was, What constitutes a transfer
of an application? Is a "hit" registered:
(1) When a demonstration is effected?
(2) When data and advice are provided?
(3) When a-test is undertaken or a technique or product
is tried?
3/ Tom Golden, Baltimore Applications Project, Second Annual Progress
Report, Greenbelt, Maryland: Goddard Space Flight Center, June 1976,
i	 pages 9-10.
f
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(4) When activity results in a study or workshop? or
(5) When a particular application is put in "place"?
Golden's progress reports revealed that when a task resulted
in any one of these, the task usually was closed out and considered
completed, suggesting that Golden cot>sidered thuc . a transfer and/or
	 ab." I
utili4ation had been made. The panel was unwilling to fully accept
Golden's '!close out" of a task as indication of a transfer or an
application. Rather, they opted to make their own judgment on the
basis of what was learned and achieved.
There were two key barriers to the panel's making a final
judgment with respect to the accomplishments of the project: (1) in-
complete data--there was insufficient information on each BAP task to
fully understand whether the task had been completed, dropped, delayed,
or otherwise developed; and (2) the time between the initiation of the
BAP and the start of the evaluation (approximately 27 months) was too
short to observe a significant number of the full-life cycles of the
tasks. On this latter point, it is important to keep in mind that the
user-pull strategy may be a longer process than the "technology-push"
strategy. The BAP strategy adopted by Goddard required addressing a
wide variety of problems identified by Baltimore officials. The
problems then were screened in terms of potential technological
applications., Next a search had tobe made for applicable technology,
followed by a further series of screening and information gathering.
Some problems inevitably had no overt technological solution; others
might be subject to solution, with further development efforts; and
f
still others might be ripe for traditional technologyapplication.
^	 I	 l l	 nI ,1^
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it is for these reasons that the panel undertook the assess-
ment of the BAP in terms of achievements and their relationships to
the objectives of the project, emphasizing the qualitative aspects of	 i
process changes ("transfer"), with secondary attention to applications 	 ...
y
or utilizations completed.
I
An Assessment in Terms of BAP Achievements
Any assessment of achievements under the Baltimore Applications
Project must take into account the environment in which most city govern
merits operate. Both the decision-making and the substantive context of
urban local government may present highly resistant barriers to technology
transfer or technology utilization.
Local government decisions and activities, such as those of
Baltimore, are best typified as short term and immediacy-oriented. In
other words, today ' s problems demand and receive first priority. Long
term perspectives, strategies, planning, and active search for innovations
receive lowest priority. Whether or not this is representative, desirable,
i
or necessary, are not the topics for this report. What is relevant is
the effect of this type of management on the introduction and use of
technology. Some identified consequences of local management, as
practiced in Baltimore, appear to be:
° Difficulty in allocating significant staff resources to
"thinking through" how to utilize technology (if at all) in
resolving current problems.
IkL
C
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The difficulty of justifying to the public, and
explaining to the press, the allocation of resources to
understanding technology sufficiently to utilize it well
in resolving current problems.
0 A need for short term fixes on visible city problems.
0 Problems in obtaining wide technical and managerial
consensus on how to resolve a problem in time to satisfy
public demands for solution.
These characteristics of local government activities have,
of necessity, shaped NASA's activities in testing technically-based
feasible solutions to Baltimore's known problems. They also directly
affect the way in which criteria can be applied to evaluating the success
of the NASA's Baltimore Applications Project.
The Goals/Objectives of the BAP
Before going into a detailed assessment of the BAP achievements,
it is useful to list briefly the BAP objectives from the perspectives of
Goddard, Baltimore,and the "third party" or general public, along with
the panel's rationale for using this particular set of objectives.
First, from the Goddard perspective, there were four main
rationales for the BAP, namely: (1) as a response to
-a "constituency"
request, (2) as an experiment with "user-pull" technology transfer,
(3) as an opportunity to increase the use of research and development
-44-
benefits accomplished under Federal sponsorship, and (4) as a means
to enhance Goddard's and thus NASA's image.
The Baltimore Applications Project came into existence primarily
because of the request on the part of a Baltimore official, Robert Embry, 	 .w a
to NASA Administrator Fletcher for the use of a NASA technical consultant
similar to the one supplied to New York City. The inital request was
reinforced by interest on the part of a Member of Congress in Baltimore,
Paul Sarbanes, (elected to the U.S. Senate, November 1976). It is
important to recognize the BAP as a legitimate and natural agency
response, creating both an .opportunity and a rationale for the BAP in
the first instance. The extent to which the "constituency" has been
satisfied by the Goddard response is an important element in judging
the project's achievements. Given the nature of the leadership at
Goddard when the request was made (1973) and the nature of the request
(seeking technical advice and assistance through use of NASA consultant),
the decision to select a "user-pull" method for technology transfer was
quite reasonable.
Donald Hearth, who, as Deputy Director at Goddard, provided
the policy direction for the project, was convinced that the general
"technology push" nature of most of NASA's technology transfer/
technology utilization programs lacked an element of reality. The
request to assist Baltimore provided an opportunity to experiment with
a strategy in which client officials identified their problems and
determined priorities. In one sense, this approach was considerably
more passive than the technology utilization programs of NASA.
1	 I 	 I	 l	 I	 i	 E
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The increased use of R&D products is a fundamental objective
of any application, utilization, or transfer effort irrespective of
the method used.	 Finally, although it is not explicitly acknowledged
in the agreements or reports, an important reason why NASA has under-
taken such projects has been to improve its standing within both its
national and local "constituencies" , and provides intangible support
i
for NASA's programs at the policy level.
Second, from Baltimore's perspective, the City had as its
primary purpose in requesting the project, improving its ability to
apply technology in addressing some of its problems.	 Within this
general purpose there existed three subgoals: 	 (1) to become more
systematic in the approach to problems and the use of technology
within Baltimore, 	 (2) to use technology as another means to improve
the City's image, and ,(3) the hope that, with greater technological
sophistication, the city might improve its access to Federal grants.
In essence, with the NASA project, the City was being given access to
considerable-breadth of technological competence and a personal means
^r
to tap it for use in whatever fashion the City could make of it.
Finally, there are the third party or general public goals,
although these were never made explicit, and, in fact, were minimized
t.	 because of the bilateral nature of the Baltimore Applications Project.
None of its fundamental purposes were directed at third party (larger
bl	 bi )	 fi	 f	 th	 1,4fi d	 d	 t	 di	 d 1	 s th tpu c ene is except or e n o un ers an ng an esson 	 a
might be forthcoming by NASA's trying a mode of technology transfer
i
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significantly different from its typical style. The first and most
important goal, hopefully, to be realized was to determine the potential
for wider application of the Baltimore Applications Project "user-pull"
style. A second goal, important to the general public, is the extent...
to which the BAP can satisfy the four criteria for technology transfer
postulated by the National Academy of Engineering Committee: (1)
evidence of widespread public benefits, (2) significant economic
benefits (or cost avoid&ace),.(3) little evidence of adverse effects,
and (4) reasonable agreement among the prime participants on objectives,
4/
benefits, roles, responsibilities, and milestones.
Goddard Objectives
The first objective of meeting a constitutency request was
generously fulfilled through the Baltimore Applications Project. The
Memorandum of Agreement between Goddard and Baltimore put NASA in the
posture of being fully responsive to a reasonable initiative on the
part of Baltimore officials. The overwhelming consensus on the part
of Baltimore officials is that Tom Golden, and through him the Goddard
Space Flight Center, have given all the cooperation that could be desired
in meeting the technological needs identified by Baltimore officials.
Neither the manpower supplied nor the resources available from Goddard
has been strained by Baltimore requests, so the full extent of Goddard's
4/ National Academy of Engineering, 02. Cit. pages 18-1.9. It is questionable
whether or not these criteria are directly applicable to the BAP which
was a_process oriented, minimum cost activity to Goddard Space Flight
Center because the NAE criteria were meant to be applied to
projects of technology transfer and utilization, prior to the commitment
of major funding for any implementation activities	 ."
y
^	
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responsiveness has yet to be tested. On the other hand, those officials
who have interacted most frequently with Golden have been both realistic
and considerate, exercising some restraint in "tapping" the system. It
should be recalled that the origin of the BAP was an overt request from
a senior Baltimore official, so the project was not a "put up job"
on the part of NASA. It is the panel's belief that the "user-pull"
strategy probably, is most successful in response to a request such as
was the case with Baltimore. The single, restrictive condition operating
here was the fact that the BAP operated within the immediate geographic
area of Goddard and no attempt was made to extend its geographic impact.
This criticism is of marginal relevance in that most Federal agencies,
like industrial organizations, seek to be good neighbors in whatever
community they are located by encouraging public service activities
related to the needs of the immediate community. A counter-argument
could be the inappropriateness for an organization like Goddard to pro-
vide such assistance outside its immediate geographic area.
There are a half dozen indicators of achievement relevant to
A
the goal of demonstrating a user-.pull strategy. One of the foremost is
that this style.of technology transfer identified areas of application
that otherwise would not have been uncovered. For example: the grass/
tree planting task, the insecticide technology task, the silt utilization 	 A
technique task, the gasoline/water emulsion task, the BOB/heavy metal
detector task, and the algae-nutrient detection task. Second, the
fundamentally passive strategy intentionally adopted by Goddard provided
f-48-
a substantial degree of flexibility in dealing with problems, and permitted
seeking solutions wherever they might be found (not limited to NASA
laboratories). This provided considerably greater opportunity for
seeking appropriate technological solutions. Third, the generally passive
nature of the user-pull method, combined with a strategy for "low
visibility", helped Golden gain acceptance and cooperation among Baltimore
officials, stimulating an open, candid relationship, providing the widest
possible avenues in the process of problem-search. Fourth, this strategy,
in combination with Golden's personable, unassuming approach, overcame
the stereotype of Federal arrogance which sometimes accompanies relation-
ships between Federal and local officials. Fifth, this strategy also
avoided false expectations on the part of Baltimore officials about quick,
i
easy, or glamorous solutions to their problems. This helped maintain and
solidify an honest, healthy dialogue about City problems and potential
solutions. Sixth, operating within this low visibility, user-pull strategy,
a
tended to avoid mistakes, or at least to minimize the repercussions of
a mistake. Since Golden stopped short of actually implementing the
application of any technology, he avoided interjecting himself into
agency operating problems which frequently are in the thick of "politics'
The panel observed that Golden performed a classic "gatekeeper" function`
as the link between the world of technology and the operational world
with its specific problems.. He was or became: (1) widely acquainted
in the host organization and recognized as having extensive external
ti
i
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and out of the host organization (principally with respect to Goddard
involvement); and (3) acknowledged to be unusually curious and innovative.
There were several shortcomings, costs or trade -offs involved
in following the "user-pull" experiment. 	 One, for example, was that
the low visibility and general informality with which the project was
s
conducted may have reduced wider participation at Goddard, reducing, 	 a
as well, the perceived priority given the project at Goddard. 	 This
may have caused some opportunities to be missed.	 As one panel member
put it, the lack of BAP formality could have "made other NASA personnel
less aware of it, less cognizant that it was a highly ranked value of
the organization (i.e. GSFQ , and,hence, indifferent to it or even
reluctant to cooperate."
Second, although the BAP has been described as an "experiment"
there was no systematic attempt to preserve data, provide adequate
monitoring and recording of the experience, and provide consistent
follow through.
Third, there were a few instances in which technical assistance
or advice was withheld consciously because it was perceived that such
advice or technological products were commercially available, and,'
n
therefore, should not be provided through the BAP.	 Whether the possible
problems presumed to be avoided by withholding such assistance outweighed
i.
the possible advantages of providing such assistance cannot be assessed;
hoever, there were some inconsistencies in the application of this practice
(such as the considerable emphasis on solar energy applications and the
operation of the Health Department Workshop).
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Finally, Golden concentrated his efforts in the first two
years on those City departments considered to be most interested and
likely to have problems which lent themselves to technological resolution.
This had the positive effect of quickly uncovering those problems most 	 •^►
amenable to technology; it also pushed into a secondary position problems
of high priority to the City that, possibly, were less susceptible to
technological intervention.
Generally, those indicators demonstrating the increased use of
research and development benefits were positive, although a combination
of the nature of the process, the short time involved, and the lack of
complete data on the tasks prevents a full answer to the question, How
much technology transfer occurred? First, it should be recognized
that the BAP extended the use or benefits of research and development--
especially as a search "activity"--at only marginal cost to NASA (probably
less than 1 1/2 man years of effort per year):
Second, in more than half of the nearly 70 tasks undertaken,
R&D competence, developed in the space program, were applied in some
fashion to problems of the City of Baltimore. Again, it was not possible
to measure the results in a quantitative fashion;. indeed, in a'good many
cases it will be some time in the future before results are fully
identified. Yet, results are apparent in the general raising of the
technological awareness of senior officials throughout the City and
i
r	 their acknowledgement that such has occurred.
Third, on at least 15 different tasks the City of Baltimore
was used or proposed to he used as a laboratory for NASA applications.
In some instances, the preliminary assessment, just prior to application,
indicated that the potential application would be inappropriate and
therefore a waste of time. In others, the potential exists for actual
application but remains dependent upon results elsewhere (such as com-
pleted development activities, commercial certification, etc.). In a
number of instances the demonstration has occured, is in the process of
occurring, or is planned to take place in the near future. Examples of
the first category are the lead paint detection, the police location
system, and satellite communication link projects. Examples of tasks
temporarily in a holding pattern are flat wiring, the application of NASA
program management, incinerator energy conversion, Modular Integrated
Utility System (MIUS), and heavy metals detector. In the category of
ongoing or soon to occur applications are Landsat data utilization,
solarization experiments, zinc paint tests, and the data collection
platform.
The one negative indicator o;; the objective of increased use
of research and development benefits is the lack of clear "applications"
in terms of traditional technology utilization. However, it should be
observed that the BAP model of technology transfer is not principally
directed toward "products". The execution of this project--as understood
by Golden--was to stop short .of implementation.
As conducted, the experiment requires a more systematic follow
through in the development of information to fully track tasks to their
conclusion. There is some reason to believe that tasks which have been
discontinued and appear not to have had a "product" require additional
--	 follow through, particularly where the action agent is outside of NASA.
9
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Two of the three indicators related to the objective of an
improved NASA image can be considered positive. First, the consistently
positive reaction from Baltimore City officials to the project and to
Golden put NASA in a very favorable light among those who were closest
to the project. The some half dozen news articles which have appeared
in Balt ~more newspapers contained no criticism whatever of the project,
were most favorable, and tended to be optimistic in terms of benefits
accruing to the City and their importance. Second, the low profile,
passive nature, typical of the NASA strategy has avoided any backlash
of the "hard sell" attributed to other kinds of technology transfer.
However, the same low profile strategy has tended to limit awareness of
the project both at Goddard and in Baltimore. Hence, except for those
who have been working directly on a BAP task within the City (and some
reporters) few have any understanding of the project and many are ignorant
of it.
Baltimore's Objectives
Baltimore ' s principal purpose from the outset was to obtain NASA
help in order that the City could better address its problems through a
more effective use of technology. Virtually all indicators show positive
results toward achieving this objective. First, the City did become
more systematic in the application of technology. The BAP ,presented the
opportunity and a congenial vehicle by which to effect this. It is true
that the "technologically most intensive" departments have done the most--
the Department of Public Works (with the highest concentration of engineers)
being foremost among them. Baltimore officials verify that the BAP has
9
i
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made them (principally at the cabinet and subcabinet levels) more
technologically conscious. 	 In addition, there has been a raising of
$: the "time horizon" of this level of officials--i.e. they exhibit a
greater awareness and concern about problems involving long-term
effects and solutions.
Second, judging by press reports of BAP activities, one would
have to conclude that it has had a positive affect on the City's image
as a progressive city.	 To some extent, the "low profile" strategy has
limited this, but the project is now approaching a stage where wider
dissemination of information about its activities should provide the
basis for judging outside reaction.
	
However, the reluctance of Baltimore
' officials, informally, to pledge financial support to fully underwrite
the BAP suggests a relatively low priority for the project.
Third, Baltimore did use its improved technological awareness
and the capability of BAP to enhance its access to Federal grant programs.
Largely through Golden's searches and initiatives, the City was successful
in obtaining a grant to finance a solar heating demonstration project--
one of several such activities undertaken or planned.
Fourth, an unanticipated benefit to the City has appeared--
"technological reassurance."	 on a number of occasions, when an agency
is confronted with several alternatives, BAP has undertaken a brief
technology assessment which resulted in confirming the choice or inclination
of City officials.	 Much of this kind of activity takes place in the BAP-
screening process before a formal task is identified, so it has remained
largely unrecorded in Golden's reports. This "reassurance" can be
equally as important as assisting in the application of a different or
"new"  technology.
Finally, there is the synergism associated with problem
identification, and the search for possible solutions. One application
attempt leads to new perspectives (perhaps new knowledge) and on to
another unanticipated application. The insecticide technology task is
a case in point. Initially, the idea was to search out chemical agents
which had not ,yet been used in Baltimore. Dr. Woods, in attacking the
problem, brought to bear not only new chemical agents but improved
methods of application, effective training of the control crews, pre-
ventive techniques, and a concern for social and other effects. In
time he uncovered the more general problem of roach immunity to chemicals,
and the opportunity to undertake some groundbreaking research which
could provide the basis for more effective roach control generally.
When one reviews the tasks pursued under the BAP, the question
arises as to whether or not the City's first priority problems are being
dealt with. The panel received the impression that Baltimore officials
doubt the applicability of high technology to many of the really pressing	 {
problems of cities--e.g. -improved housing, or fiscal stability--so that
programs like the BAP are used principally to tackle lesser problems.
1
Certainly no dramatic solutions can be claimed by the BAP. However,
two assertions must be borne in mind: (1) the suggestion that high' 	 1
technology is of little use in addressing the major problems of cities
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has yet to be tested, and in any case, probably is unrelated to the
process of technology transfer being addressed here; and (2) major
urban problems are not monolithic, but are composed of many parts so
that the improvement of any portion can contribute to the solution of
the larger problem.
Third Party of Public Benefits
Before discussing the presence or lack of third party benefits,
it is important to note that the BAP is bilateral and not directed toward
third party benefits. This is in contrast to most other technology
transfer or utilization programs, e.g. NASA Technology Applications
Teams, its Technology Utilization program, or Public Technology In-
corporated's consortium.
Most of the positive evidence of third party benefits is of
a prospective nature. It has provided a new experience with a different
ti.
mode of technology transfer, which might be applied in other places.
The system can be improved as will be discussed later, but even in its
experimental stage BAP demonstrated a capability for raising the
technological awareness of top City officials.
There is little evidence of "application" in the traditional
sense of new technology implemented in Baltimore, or more importantly,
that BAP influenced other groups to apply technology. Thus far the
BAP has not developed ties with industry that would encourage or
facilitate commercialization of BAP applications, or lead to longer
L -A
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term r.elatior.hips of technical assistance once the experiment is
concluded. It may be too early to assert flatly that a bilateral
program of technology transfer, based upon user-pull, does not provide
any substantial third party benefits. Such benefits are most likely
to be derived from the tendency of peer cities to copy successful
experiments/applications observed in sister cities. The BAP is too
young and at too low a level of visibility for such affects to be evident
yet.
The Question of Cost-Effectiveness
From the beginning the panel recognized that traditional cost-
effectiveness measures probably would not be applicable. The lack of
data has confirmed this. In Baltimore the principal "resource" applied
has been the time of City officials, and this could be estimated only
in broad terms by department or agency heads; such data collection
was not undertaken since it was judged that the data produced
would not be worth the effort to collect it. Much the same situation
exists at Goddard. The BAP is a recognized project and those who con-
tribute work have been encouraged to charge time to it; but no one
outside the project office has done so. Interviews with participating
GSFC officials suggest that time ranging from a few days to several
weeks has been applied to different BAP tasks. The BAP project office
costs consist principally of between one and two man years represented
by Tom Golden, the project director, and others in the Office of
National Needs spending part time on the project.
1	 I	 f
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The panel considers these costs to be negligible--both for
Baltimore and for Goddard--when one considers the amount of overhead
time commonly expended in either organization.	 The benefits have
been substantial, but rarely measurable in terms of days gained or
dollars saved by the introduction of a technique or device. 	 However,
some such benefits are occurring. 	 For example, the use of zinc-based
paint on heavy equipment has the potential of reducing maintenance
(and replacement) costs, but is still in the process of testing and
R, evaluation.	 More typically, BAP tasks had a longer term to completion,
and many result in systems improvements which are difficult to measure.
Examples are the data collection platform, now in the early demonstration
x stage, where the goal is improved water quality monitoring; or the
application of NASA program management techniques which is directed
at adapting management tools for use in several Baltimore departments.
Here benefits are less discrete.
One of the major needs of urban government officials, as
evident from the Baltimore experiment, is to be kept aware more broadly
of technology that might be of use to them in their activities. 	 Golden
served this need well, and it should be recognized as an 'important short-
term success even though its benefits are not easily quantifiable and
may be indirect or delayed.
	
Part of this information process has been
the raising of technical awareness among key officials so that this
dimension of problem identification and solution is more systematically
used.
i
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The panel believes that the cost-benefit ratio for the BAP
is on the side of benefits derived compared to cost in view of the
many systems benefits (as well as those still in process) and the
relatively small investment by either GSFC or Baltimore.
Recommendations
T.t is important to keep in mind the framework within which
the panel makes its recommendations. First, the panel was asked to
evaluate the BAP in terms of the project's purposes, and how it was
conducted. Second, the panel has not collected data on other NASA
technology transfer or utilization programs, or programs elsewhere,
for purposes of comparison. Third, the panel has viewed the BAP,
based on its stated purposes, as an experiment in technology transfer,
and not in terms of an indefinite, continuing responsibility of the
Goddard Space Flight Center. The study is relevant to the more general
question of the extent of NASA's, or of the Federal Government's, role
in technical assistance to local government (and others as well); but,
the panel believes this to be outside the scope of its task and does
not address that question in this study.
1. The Baltimore Applications Project should be continued for
at least two more years to: (a) obtain better, more systematic data for
assessing impact--both in Baltimore and at Goddard; and, (b) to test
what the panel believes are desirable shifts in the strategy of the
project.
With respect to the first point, (a), the BAP is a process-
oriented exploratory project, which, necessarily, had to be flexible in
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approach and conduct.	 In retrospect, it is evident that considerably
more attention should have been devoted to systematic data collection
and the accurate tracking of tasks.	 In order to learn the most from
I
such an experiment it is necessary to record as much as possible (not
to be confused with extensive formal reporting systems). 	 Golden kept
a journal on the project, beginning in April, 1974, but the entries
began to grow shorter in the fall of 1974 and ceased entirely in the
spring of 1976.	 In the future a daily log book or journal, supplemented
by file references, and running accounts of task histories or life
cycles, is an absolute minimum.	 Task coordinators, from the beginning,
should be asked to keep some estimate of time associated.with the task,
both oii the Baltimore and on the Goddard sides.
To some extent, the data needed to make a full judgment is not
j yet available because the full skein of events associated with many of
the tasks has yet to unfold; therefore, evaluation is, of necessity,
preliminary and provisional. 	 Two examples from the mini-cases are the
incinerator conversion task and the insecticide technology task. 	 The
 former will be several years more in the process of construction and
test, with the application of more advanced heat pipe technology still
an option beyond that.
	 The roach control task is likely to either be
phased out or blossom into a second stage of more intense activity in-
cluding the initiation of some fundamental research.
Addressing the second point,
	
(b), regarding desired shifts in
the project, the panel believes that five modifications can be made in
p
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the BAP which will provide valuable experience to mare fully evaluate
the feasibility and usefulness of the user-pull strategy. The changes
which should be instituted are:
- drop the "low profile" stance, making a determined effort
to raise the level of awareness about the project in Baltimore and at
a.
GSFC,
-	
be less "conservative" in withholding assistance from Baltimore
_	 officials when commercial sources are perceived to be available;
-	 make a greater effort to identify NASA technology fully ex-
ploiting Technology Utilization resources, which might be applied to
Baltimore problems;
-	
give serious consideration to taking a task or two into the
implementation stage where political sensitivities may be found; and
-	
consider the desirability of having Baltimore share at least
some of the cost, now fully borne by GSFC, of the project director.
The panel believes that the usefulness of the low visibility
approach, which was needed initially, has been outlived. 	 There is too
much evidence of the need for greater awareness of the project in
Baltimore and at GSFC.	 The panel does not endorse adopting a "hard
E	 sell" approach, but a judicious publicizing of the project, its purposes
and tasks.	 This will help	 n sharing the learning being accomplishedP	 g
k a
and encourage wider involvement.
	
It should also stimulate better
E
follow-through in keeping all involved fully informed, and possibly,
clearer priority for the project in Baltimore and at Goddard. 	 The panel
a
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found limited evidence that participation by some at Goddard was dis-
couraged by their supervisors on the basis that the BAP lacked a
significant priority.
Golden has been very cautious in avoiding tasks which would
place the BAP in the position of providing services that are available
on a commercial basis. The panel does not quarrel with this general
policy, but questions the rigidity of interpretation. To the extent
possible, advice and assistance should be provided agency officials,
carefully tracking progress on such tasks. This hesitance has been
most notable in the one field where NASA probably has the most to
offer in the. way of technical competence--communications.
After two years much of the problem identification process has
been completed in the more technologically intensive agencies. The
priority always has been on defining problems from the perspective of
Baltimore officials, yet the project director now has considerable
familiarity with the City, its officials and problems. More attention
should be focused on specifically what NASA technology might be most
useful to Baltimore problems, _a process that has not been neglected,
but one wh'ah has been considerably submerged to problem identification.
Full use should be made of NASA's own Technology Utilization resources.
This will help provide more timely information as well as assist in
illuminating the question of how applicable high technology is to urban
problem-solving.
Those tasks which appear to ,impinge on political sensitivities
or carry the possibility of some involvement in implementation have been
c
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carefully avoided. Some of these may be problems of high priority.
"Playing it safe" precludes the opportunity to test technology 	 a
application, and may tend, over time, to limit applications to problems 	 a
of secondary importance. If the purpose of the BAP is to learn, some
risks must be taken.
Finally, some consideration should now be given to cost-
sharing the technology agent's salary on the part of Baltimore.
Baltimore officials profess a belief that the BAP has proved useful.
If it does have real value to Baltimore., some such cost-sharing is in
order to more fully demonstrate this judgment. One of the panel members
believes that, as the basis for continuing, Baltimore should bear half
of the agent's salary. By sharing these costs, Baltimore officials may
be stimulated to make more effective use of this resource. Although
there appears to be no serious opposition among Baltimore officials
toward some cost-sharing, they strongly believe that fiscal and other
problems peculiar to the central city require special assistance from
Federal departments--and technical assistance such as the BAP is one
such mode of welcomed assistance.
a
2. As a second priority, GSFC should consider a limited
extension of the BAP experiment to another location, under certain
conditions, in order to more fully determine its general applicability
as a practical means for accomplishing technology transfer. Such an
extension should be at a location geographically adjacent to Goddard,
should be on the basis of initiative from the client (not, limited to
city government), and should incorporate specific goals, systematic
data collection, and evaluation.
`	 i
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The panel believes that the project could be tested usefully
in another location to more completely determine whether its relative
success is the result of the strategy or of factors peculiar to
Baltimore. The receptivity of Baltimore officials to the BAP was
impressive, raising the possibility that other locations might not be
as congenial. The panel is convinced that any second location should
be adjacent to Goddard--e.g. within an hour's drive--for several reasons:
first, to minimize cost to both parties; second, to provide the widest
possible access; and third, to be consistent with the general Federal
policy of faciliating good community relations between Federal installa-
tions and the communities in which they are located and from which they
draw their employees.
In considering a second location, GSFC officials should include
county and state governments, as well as municipal, but should undertake
a second iteration only upon invitation. The panel believes that this
is important to the success of the user-pull strategy for technology
	
i
transfer and greatly facilitates the initial establishment of the program.
As in the case of continuation of the BAP, one panel member believes
that the earnest involvement by the host government can be demonstrated
by equally sharing the cost of the agent's salary.
Finally, any test of the BAP concept at a second location
should, to achieve maximum value and understanding: (1) provide clearly
stated, specific goals for the experiment; (2) establish a means for
systematic tracking of tasks and full data collection coordinate with the
	 1
9
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development of the basic memorandum of understanding; and (3) include
a process for evaluation involving both GSFC and client personnel.
Such a project should be organized and instrumented as a true experi-
ment in order to be able to distinguish the differences between BAP
and BAPZ• 1
In conclusion, the panel wishes to commend the Goddard Space
Flight Center for sponsoring a successful demonstration of the "user-
1
pull" strategy for technology transfer. It definitely is a contribution	 n
to a better understanding of the process of technology transfer and
utilization. The technique requires a willing and cooperative client
(Baltimore), a patient and sharing sponsor (GSFC) and a politically
sensitive, technically competent and personable project director 	 1
(Tom Golden). All of these are absolutely vital to achieving results
through this strategy for technology transfer.
r.
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Sketches of Panel Members and Staff
f.
Charles F. Bonser
Dean of the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana
University. The School has been responsible for the operation of
one of NASA's Regional Dissemination Centers. Dean Bonser has
served as Associate Dean for Administration at Indiana University's
School of Business, as Director of the Indiana State Tax and Financial
Policy Commission, as Tax Advisor to the Indiana General Assembly
and as Economic Development Advisor to the Lt. Governor of Indiana.
Dean Bonser currently is President of the National Association of
Schools of Public Affairs and Administration.
James D. Carroll.
Professor of Public Affairs and Director of the Public Administration
Department, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University. He is a researcher
on the Urban Technology Project being conducted by the Maxwell School
and Syracuse Research Corporation with the support of the National
Science Foundation. He was a staff member of the Office of Urban
Technology and Research, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, in the 1960s. He has written several articles on science
and technology policy.
Ruth M. Davis
Director of the Center for Computer Sciences and Technology, National
Bureau of Standards. She has served as Director of the Lister Hill
National Center for Biomedical Communications, Associate Director of
the National Library of Medicine, and as Staff Assistant for Intelligence
r	 and Reconnaissance in the Office of the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, Department of Defense. She is the recipient of the
National Civil Service League Award (1976), Rockefellow Public Service
Award for Professional Accomplishment and Leadership (1973), the Depart-
ment-of Commerce Gold Medal Award (1972), and Federal Women of the
Year Award (1972). She is a member of the National Academy of Engineer-
ing, the New York Academy of Science and numerous professional societies.
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Francie E. Rourke
Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University
since 1961 and Chairman of the Department between 1964 and 1970.
He has also taught at Yale University and the University of California,
Berkeley. He was Director of the Commission for the Expansion of Public
and Higher Education in Maryland, Vice-Chairman of the Governor's Com-
mission for the Modernization of State Government in Maryland, and
Treasurer of the American Political Science Association. He has been
a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Politics and the
Public Administration Review, and is now on the editorial board of
Administration and Society. Among the books he has authored are
Secrecy and Publicity Dilemmas of Democracy; Bureaucracy, Politics
and Public Policy; and Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy.
Dei1 S. Wright
Professor of Political Science and Research Professor in the Institute
for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina. Since
1973 he has served as Director of the Master of Public Administration
Program in the Department of Political Science. Professor Wright has
authored or coauthored books, monographs, research reports, and
articles in the fields of federalism, state and local government, public
administration, intergovernmental relations, and public finance.
Academy Staff
Richard L. Chapman
Senior Research Associate of the Academy, previously served in
administrative positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
U.S. Bureau of the Budget, and the Public Health Service; also as
Staff Director for a member of Congress, Chief Consultant to House
Government Operations Subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs,
and Ass.Istant Director of Research of the South Dakota Legislative
Resear(_a Council.
Eleanor C. Hodges
Presently a candidate for Master of Arts degree in International
Relations at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University. Holds a B.A. in political science from the University
of Delaware.
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Nty
Memorandum of Understanding
NASA-Baltimore Applications Project
April 26, 1974
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
NASA-Baltimore Applications Project
Background and Objective
It is the policy of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to
encourage cooperative projects as a means of facilitating and accelerating
the transfer of aerospace technology to public sector areas of concern.
In cooperation with the City of Baltimore, NASA agrees to undertake a
unique pilot project of an initial two-year duration to test the feasibility
and measure the effects of utilizing technology in the solutions of problems
that affect the urban environment, generally, and that challenge the public
administrators of Baltimore, specifically.
This experimental project is to be known as the NASA-Baltimore Applica-
tions Project, and will be conducted under the joint direction and coordina-
tion of individuals designated by the Office of the Mayor; Office of the
Director, Goddard Space Flight Center; and the NASA Technology Utilization
Office.
Project Administration
NASA will recommend a candidate for the position of liaison between NASA
and Baltimore. The person recommended for this position will be known as
the Director, Technology Transfer Project (Director, TTP). The individual
recommended will be expected to possess current knowledge of NASA and
the federal establishment, general technical skills, active imagination, and
natural ability to work cooperatively with Baltimore City officials and citizens
in pursuit of project goals. Selection of the initial Director, TTP, and
any subsequent directors will be jointly determined by NASA and the Office
of the Mayor.
The overall function of the Director, TTP, will be under the general admin-
istrative supervision and direction of the Director, Goddard Space Flight
Center, or his designee. The daily activities of the Director, TTP, will
be under the direction and immediate supervision of a designated official
representing the Office of the Mayor.
The Director, TTP, will be housed in the Offices of the Mayor during the
period of performance under this agreement, and the City will provide
parking, office accommodations, and the necessary clerical and related
support services, such as office supplies and telephone. GSFC will provide
office accommodations and related support services at Goddard during
periods when the Director, TTP, visits the Center in the performance of
his work.
tt>
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Memorandum of Understanding
NASA-Baltimore Applications Project
Expenses and Travel
GSFC will pay the full salary and benefits of the Director, TTP. Travel
expenses will be shared among the participants on the following basis:
1. GSFC will pay all per diem and direct transportation costs, including
local transportation, for all travel.
2. Problem-solving trips to research centers, industrial plants, technology
libraries, etc., are considered project-related travel and the City of
Baltimore will reimburse GSFC for such direct transportation costs
(including local transportation) and related expenses (taxi, parking,
baggage, etc.). Prior city approval of such travel is required for
expenses to be considered reimburseable. Per diem costs will not be
reimbursed to NASA.
3. Career-development travel expenses (e.g., for training or symposium
attendance) are not to be considered project-related and are not
reimburseable.
4. The Director, TTP, will bear the costs of commuting to and from
work, whether at Goddard or Baltimore.
Outline of Project and Operating Plan
In cooperation with Baltimore City officials and under the immediate direc-
tion of the individuals designated responsible for his activities, the Director,
TTP, will review and analyze those areas of particular concern to Baltimore
officials. Problem areas identified will then be screened from the stand-
point of their susceptibility to solution by the application of existing NASA
technology or that developed by other federal research and development
activities.
Certain on-going NASA-sponsored applications engineering projects may be
of interest in this experimental project. The Director, TTP, will apprise
city officials of these on-going projects, especially those that would seem
to satisfy specified needs. The City of Baltimore agrees to provide appro-
priate sites, facilities, resources, and personnel required to test applica-
tions engineering projects it might select to address its specified needs.
In the search for available technology to meet perceived needs, all sources
of technical information available to NASA and NASA contractors are to be
made available to the Director, TTP. Among such sources and services
are:
1. NASA data base including domestic and foreign aerospace
technical reports and the published literature contained therein.
2. Professional expertise at NASA laboratories.
4...
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Memorandum of Understanding
NASA-Baltimore Applications Project
3. Current projects and accumulated experience of:
1¢
	 a. NASA Technology Applications Teams
b. NASA Biomedical Applications Teams
c. Applications Technology Office, NASA Office of Aeronautics
and Space Technology.
4. Technical information retrieval services. As required, these
will be furnished by the NASA Scientific and Technical Informa-
tion Facility, College Park, Maryland. The City agrees to
purchase, at standard nominal fees, other tailored technical
information retrieval services, provided by NASA-sponsored
Regional Dissemination Centers, needed on specific problems.
Such services will be authorized and approved by appropriate
authorities of the City.
The function of matching existing technology to identified needs requires
careful definition and screening, and a broad understanding of NASA R&D
Programs and administrative procedures for conducting research and
evaluation. NASA officials will work closely with the Director, TTP, in
this regard, offering the guidance and counsel necessary for effective
matching of technology to need.
Reports
1. Informal Quarterly Report. The Director, TTP, will furnish an
informal activities report to NASA and Baltimore at the end of
each quarter, to be completed the first week of the succeeding
quarter. This progress/status report will document activities
for the period and outline work plans for the following period.
2. Formal Annual Report, The Director, TTP, with the coopera-
tion and assistance of the appropriate officials of Baltimore,
will prepare and submit to NASA a draft of an Annual Report
within thirty days following the anniversary date of this project.
This report will document results, including major activities
undertaken during the course of the experimental project. It
is to highlight lessons learned, with recommendations for struc-
tur.ing any future and continuing efforts of a similar nature.
(Signature)	 4/26/74	 (Signature)	 4/26/74
John F. Clark	 Date	 William D. Schaefer
Director
	
Mayor
Goddard Space Flight Center	 City of Baltimore
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APPENDIX C
Summary of Tasks, Baltimore Applications Project
May 1974 - September 1976
This summary was derived from quarterly and annual
reports made by the BAP Project Director, Tom Golden.
It illustrates the variety and scope of problems
with which he dealt, but does not include many in-
formal inquiries made to him, and answered or otherwise
disposed of, during this period.
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Baltimore Goddard
Task Title Department/Agency Involvement Status or Disposition
Air Breathing Apparatus Fire Department Golden; PTI, In- Demonstrated.	 Decision not to pur-
formatics, Inc. chase: (1) still have to get through
window; (2) 50% increase (15 min.)
in supply, (3) cost of equipping
department and high pressure charging
tank.
1
All-weather Road Public Works Golden Already use sylvax (commercially
Patching available) and are satisfied.
2
Fire Escape Device Fire Department Golden; Headquarters Not available for demonstration; no
T.U., MSFC commercial manufacturer of the
device.
3
Flat Wiring Department of Housing Golden, NASA, T.U., Samples to HCD, U.L. tests had not
and Community Develop- MSFC been completed; no further follow
ment through--departments to be notified
upon completion of testing.
4
Glass Substitutes Department of Recreation Golden, GSFC Samples of Lexan with new type of
and Parks Materials, Engineer- coatings provided: improved resistance
ing Branch to scratching, but not sufficient
to apply.
5
Grass/Tree Planting Department of Housing Golden;	 ARS Information and names of local con-
and Community Develop- tractors provided project manager
ment of Coldspring.	 No further follow-up.
6 j
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Baltimore Goddard
Task. Title Department/Agency Involvement Status or Disposition
High Temperature Paint Public Works Golden; Dr. John Information on high temperature
Schutt, Earth paint for pyrolysis plant provided;
Resources Branch paint applied.
7
Computer Accounting Department of Housing Golden Determined task could be accomplished
for Housing Authority and Community Develop- by commercial.organizations. 	 No
ment further action.
8
Probeye Demonstration Fire Department Golden Demonstration made, department plans
to buy several.
9
Sewer Flow Meter (Part Public Works Golden; Headquarters, Evaluation underway in Dallas, Texas,
of Water Quality) T.U. data to be given Baltimore upon
completion of Dallas testing.
10
Soft Surface Materials Department of Recreation Golden; Headquarters, Materials made available to depart-
Test and Parks T.U. -SRI sent for test, no further follow-
up.
11
Water Immersed Bearings Department of Recreation GSFC Materials Brainstorming session at GSFC con-
and Parks Groups eluded no material available is
better than brass, with proper
lubrication.
12
Window Barricade Department of Housing GSFC and ad hoc Same solutions at Baltimore--try a
Material and Community Develop- group new masonry nail.
mcnt
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Baltimore Goddard
Task Title Department/AgencX Involvement Status or Disposition
Computer Graphics Department of Planning Golden; HUD, NSF, Information on Charlotte, N.C.
Charlotte, N.C. integrated municipal information
system given to Planning Department
for evaluation.
14
Culture.Transporter Department of Public GSFC Engineering Tests by GSFC showed thermal boxes
Tests Health Applications Branch using fused salts had design
deficiencies within required range.
Should continue use of battery-
powered boxes.
15
Digital Traffic Department of Transit Golden Awaiting installation of new traffic
ControllEmergency and Traffic_ control system.
Vehicle Routing
16
Fire/Smoke Detection Fire Department Golden Discussions with National Bureau
Devices of Standards; no further action.
17
Fire Station Location Fire Department Robert W. Nelson, Department has contract with Johns
GSFC consulting with Hopkins for study; provided informa-
Johns Hopkins and tion and data to Johns Hopkins and
Department city.	 Priority problems at GSFC,
1$
Insecticide Techn :jlogy Department of Housing Golden; Dr. Eugene Wood is working with the Department
and Community Develop- Wood, University of ' and established pilot program.
ment Maryland
19
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Baltimore Goddard
Task Title Department/Agency Involvement Status or Disposition
Landsat Data Utiliza- Public Works Golden; GSFC Data Department has contract with General
tion (Part of Water Collection Branch Electric, also has experiment (DCP)
Quality) with GSFC/Wallops help; information
to Regional Planning Council.
20
NASA Program Manage- Department of Planning, GSFC, Systems Develop- Discussions, Baltimore personnel
ment Public Works ment and Analysis participated in NASA mini-pert.
Branch, and Adminis- classes.	 Baltimore selected IBM
tration and Manage- systems.
ment Directorate
21
Science Education Department of Education GSFC Educational Discussions--Baltimore Engineering
Assistance Programs Office, Society is undertaking this as a
Elva Bailey project.
22
Silt Utilization Department of Recreation Golden, Hitman Asso- Cost studies by departments involved
Techniques and Parks, Housing and ciates, Army Corps.of are in process, conducted assays of
Community Development, Engineers silt.
Public Works
23
Trash Vehicle Routing Public Works, Department Golden, GSFC Sanitation Information Systems must
of Planning be limited, but implementation pro-
blems with 5IS of a political/
management nature.	 Dropped.
24
Water System Simula- Public Works Early stages, appears feasible,
tion (Part of Water collecting information from SIE for
Quality) evaluation.
25
iBaltimore Goddard
Task Title De artment/A enc Involvement Status or Disposition
Algae/Nutrient Public Works Golden, Johns Part of Data Collection Platform.
Detection (Part of Hopkins,	 (See
Water Quality) Landsat Data)
26
Bridge Safety . Public Works Golden Technology reviewed, but not
Inspection operationally applicable.
Dropped.
27
Char/Ash Separation Public Works Golden;AIAA Baltimore Baltimore Chapter of AIAA is prepar-
Chapter ing a report for DPW recovery of
energy and materials at pyrolysis.
28
Child Health Informa- Health Department Golden, GSFC on Discussions lead to recognition of
tion System--Public Workshop need to address nature of public
Health Workshop health mission--workshops project.
29
Firescene Communica- Fire Department Golden Discussed but dropped, not useful.
tions
I
Gasoline/Water Golden, Jesse Madey Monitoring work at Oklahoma unit
Emulsion and tests at MIT; reserve-recom-
mendations pending test completion..
31
Incinerator Energy Public Works Golden; Planning and Conducted consultant study and pro-
Conversion Programming, vided results; also waiting further
Facilities Engineer- R&D on heat pipes..
ing
32
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Baltimore Goddard
Task Title Department /Agency Involvement Status or Disposition
Laser Building Cleaner Public Works Golden;Boyle, Laser Discussions--does not appear
Technology Branch promising.
33
Lead Paint Detection Department of Health Golden; NASA, Elkins Discussions suggested that NASA
Dable, GSFC, Dr. lightweight model not sufficiently
Jacob Tromble, advan *_agous to replace existing
Spectroscopy Branch detectors.
Dropped.
34
Methane Recovery Department of Hospitals, Golden, GSFC Planning Consultant study shows feasible,
Public Works and Programming but treatment plant retrofit must
Branch wait pending changes in plant/
operation construction to meet EPA
• and state requirements.
35
Modular Integrated Planning Department, Golden; JSC Discussions, plans for first phase
Utilities System Housing and Community Coldspring too advanced for a_pplica-
Development tion.	 No further action.
36
Municipal Information Office of Telecommcmica- Golden Low priority, included as part of
Data Base tions, Department of Health Workshop.
Health
37
Police Location Police Department Golden, GSFC Technology not available to meet
System vertical and horizontal location.
38
Pollution Situation Public Works Golden, EPA Discussions with city and EPA
Center (Part of Water officials; pending.
Quality)
39
Baltimore Goddard
Task 'title - Department/Age c Involvement Status or Disposition
Rapid Bacterial Health Department JSC Dropped as of September 1975, deter-
Detectors mined that a unit was under commercial
development and to be announced in
six to nine months.	 City and Johns
Hopkins hospitals to be informed
when ready for marketing.
40'
Rat Control Experi- Health Department Golden; Edgewood Discussions revealed lack of funding
ments Arsenal; Center for and priority in 'HEW to pursue new
Defense Control control substance. Dropped.
41
Satellite Communica- Police Department Dependent on other tasks, too low
tion Link Test priority in city. Dropped.
42
Sludge /Pyrolysis/ Public Works JPL, ERDA Tests underway in Albuquerque, N.M.
Thermoradiation Data to be available from there;
shifted to "wastewater treatment
techniques."
43
Baltimore Goddard
Task Title Department/Agency Involvement Status or Disposition
Solarization Department of Education, Golden, Hymowitz,
Experiment Housing and Community Firehouse
Development, Department
of Planning
- Sharpe-Leadenhall - proposal (w/GE) fir solar heating/
School cooling for Sharpe-Leadenhall,
proposal unsuccessful,
- Solar assisted hot
water heating - put together proposal for Westport
demonstration on solar hot water.
- with/architect (Wm. Potts) ' and .i
- Upton Center Solar engineer (Mueller Associates) made
Heating & Cooling proposal to ERDA for solar heating
Demonstration • of Upton Center, project was funded.
- Conventicn Center - Briefed convention center planners,
Solar Energy System no further action.
- Baltimore Aquarium - Studied.	 Dropped.
44
Street Sweeper Con- Public Works Golden, Jim Mills, Plan a "brainstorming" session between!,
cepts Facilities Engineer- DPW and GSFC officials, some develop-
ing Division ments in Europe.
Pending.
45
BOD/Heavy Metals Public Works Golden Developing instrumentation for
Detector (Part of application.
Water Quality)
46
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Baltimore Goddard
Task Title Department/Agensy Involvement Status or Disposition
Communication Systems Mayor's Office of Golden Feasibility study in a single
Program Telecommunications department is being planned.
- demonstrations, (Health)
wired and unwired
47
Other communications Mayor's Office of Golden Discussion lead to "test" case in
tasks Telecommunications Health Department--plan to hold work-
shop on communication and data pro-
- teleconferencing blems in Department in cooperation
experiments with MOT.
See #51.
- electronic displays
and maps
- high speed facsimile
over phone lines.
48
Industrial Park Planning Department, Golden Discussions with ERDA, exploration of
Survey--Energy Con- Baltimore Economic possible grant; potential for IR use
servation Development Corp. to identify "energy leakage"--data
provided for development of a proposal
to ERDA.
49
High-Rise Safety Housing and Community Golden, Mills and Discussion, planning; workshop
Workshop Development Wolff conducted 9/75; report issued in
late fall, 1975.
50
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Baltimore Goddard
Task Title Department/Agen2y Involvement Status or Disposition
Health Department Health Department_, Golden, Mills, Wolfe, Began in late 1975 planning for com-
Workshop Mayor's Office of and Parker munication/information workshop on
Telecommunications Health Department "needs"; feedback
to #47.
51
Law Enforcement (Friedman) Mayor's Golden, GSFC Systems Computerized criminal justice data;
Technology Law and Enforcement Development and LEAA; continuing assessment of
Coordinator Analysis Branch various Systems.
52
Zinc Paint Tests Public Works, Brad Dr. John Schutt, To paint on salt spreaders and
Blake, City Garage GSFC cement mixers; applied in December
1975; evaluation continuing.
53
Data Collection Public Works, Jerry Golden, Cordan, and Grew out of algae-nutrient
Platform Valcik Cote detection (#26 and Landsat data).
In process.
54
Hazards and Crisis Fire, Police, Office of Golden Discussions re: risk analysis,
Planning Safety, Office of handling dangerous materials; brief-
Disaster Control ing on Risk Management System
(KSC/NYC).
55
"911" Emergency Fire, Police, Mayor, Golden "White paper" on pros and cons for
Service Berkowitz Fire Chief, Police Commissioner,
Mayor and Berkowitz. No further action.
56
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Baltimore Goddard
Task Title Department/Agency Involvement Status or Disposition
Waterwaste Symposium Public Works Golden Advice and assistance in preparing
for DPW-sponsored one day symposium
on advantages "state of the art".
57
Security Against Housing and Community Golden In process of collecting information
Unauthorized Visitors Development from knowledgeable sources.
in High Rise Housing
58
Dealing with Senility Housing and Community Golden Collecting information/sources.
in Public Housing Development
Residents
59
Dutch Elm Disease Recreation and Parks Golden Literature and information provided
department heads.
60
Renovated City Hall Public Works Goldin Information and sources supplied
Attraction construction management heads and
architect.
61
Baltimore Zoo Recreation and Parks Golden Probably not cost-effective, investiga
Methane Recovery _ tion will continue.
62
National Water Data Public Works Golden Provided information to department
Exchange heads.
63
n
r
t,
	 f	 1
f
APPENDIX D
Mina.-Case Studies
In order to provide a richer depth of detail,
especially to better reveal the nature of working
level participation by Goddard scientists and
engineers, five tasks were selected for more
detailed exploration: (1) incinerator energy
recovery, (2) data collection platform, (3) in-
secticide technology, (4) Health Department
Workshop, and (5) solarization experiments.
The five were selected, not because they were
"representative" of the 69 plus tasks, but
because four of the five provided a means to
better explore Goddard participation, and all
promised data access lacking in many of the
other tasks.
No single pattern prevails among these five mini-
cases. They do reveal a persistence--bot2h by
interested Baltimore officials and by those
providing outside assistance --to seek solutions
which can prove effective and acceptable. None
sought or achieved great visibility, though
several were noted by the local press.
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Incinerator Energy Recovery Task
This task involved investigating different techniques to
make use of "waste" heat from city trash incinerators, specifically,
reviewing potential applications of the Pulaski Highway Incinerator
in Baltimore. The task was initiated when Charles L. Benton, Director
of Finance for the City of Baltimore, wrote to the Mayor in June 1974,
suggesting that NASA (under the BAP) be asked to look into the question
of the potential use of waste heat at the city incinerators. [Benton
had been asked by the Mayor to monitor solid waste disposal problems
in the City.] The letter was relayed by the Mayor to Berkowitz who
brought it to Golden's attention. Golden, who was aware of developments
in heat pipe technology, saw this as a useful opportunity for applying
Goddard technology in Baltimore. [Heat pipes were used at Goddard in
developing space craft technology to equalize heating in space craft.
The fundamental technology has been widely applied, including using
heat pipes on the Alaska oil pipe line to maintain stable soil con-
ditions.]
A group at Goddard in the Facilities Engineering Division had
been working on a research project aimed at achieving a significant
improvement in heat pipe technology. The research crew had run into a
problem, giving this group some "slack time" so that they were eager to
respond when Golden asked the team to have a look at potential applications
of heat pipes for capturing waste heat in the Baltimore City incinerators.
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On February 6, 1975, James Mills, Chief of the Facilities Engineering
Division and James Robinson, Chief of the Planning Section, Planning
and Programming Branch of that di,, ision, Golden, Dr. Walter Bienert
and Mr. Allan Streb of Dynatherm Corporation visited the Pulaski
Incinerator. During the visit this group did some informal calcuations
which led them to conclude that a simple one percent efficiency re-
covery of waste heat could provide more than enough electricity to
a
replace that being used by the incinerator plant--one possible use.
It was the intention of s he group at Goddard to "marry" the new
generation of heat pipe technology, then under development, for
application in the Baltimore incinerators. Unfortunately, the devel-
opment was lagging; so, in order to meet Baltimore's need, the group
I
decided to (as an interim measure) review more conventional methods.
Since the Facilities Engineering Division already had a group of
engineering consultants under contract (Berger Associates of Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania) a task order was issued in March 1975, for Berger Associates
to conduct a feasibility study of recovering energy from the Pulaski
Incinerator, They were to produce a "thermal" model of the incinerator
and to recommend conventional energy capture methods. An engineer on
the Department of Public Works staff, Mr. Milton Reizenstein, worked
with the consultants by collecting data from industrial concerns in the
general area of the incinerator to determine the potential "market" for
steam. The consultants reviewed this possibility as well as the
application of this steam for use at a City hospital complex (some
distance from the incinerators).
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An interim report was delivered in the spring of 1975, and reviewed
by the Department of Public Works. It does not appear economically
feasible to use the steam at a location not immediately adjacent to
the incinerator. The Goddard team concluded that one alternative
might be the use of steam at the incinerator to generate electricity
for the incinerator. In cooperation with officials of the Department
of Public Works, Goddard officials will discuss the possibility of
"trading" electricity generated at the plant with the Baltimore Gas
and Electric Company (which might actually operate the generating
equipment). As the research in improved heat pipe technology pro-
gresses, Goddard will maintain close contact with the Baltimore
Department of Public Works and continue to review the possible incorpora-
tion of heat pipe technology in new incinerator construction within
the City.
.6.	 1
'
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Data Collection Platform
This task is an experiment to determine if fresh water quality
in a reservoir supplying the City of Baltimore can be monitored remotely
using the Landsat. satellite. The task was started when Fred Gordon
of Goddard's Mission Utilization Office, Applications Directorate,
suggested to Tom Golden that some use might found in Baltimore for
ocean, platforms which have been used for remote sensing in a global
atmospheric test program. It was Golden's opinion that there was a
strong possibility these platforms could prove useful. Golden checked
informally with a number, of Baltimore officials, and it was determined
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that there was a willingness on the part of the officials at Wallops
to cooperate by making several of these instrumented platforms available.
During the late fall of 1975, a meeting was held with officials from
the Bureau of Operations in the Department of Public Works (Gene L.
Neff headed the Bureau at that time) with Walter J. Koterwas, Chief
of the Division of Water, Richard J. Kretzschmar of the Water Engineering
Division, and Jerry A. Valcik, Chief of the Water Quality Section.: Goddard
officials attending were Golden, Fred Gordon, Charles Cote, Head of the
Data Collections Systems Branch in the Communications and Navigations
Division and his colleague, Dr. _Earle Painter.
The problem which the Public Works officials wished to tackle
was monitoring water quality in their Loch Raven reservoir. This
reservoir was of particular interest because it was showing early stages
of eutrophication, and they wished to chart key changes which occur
over various seasons as well as to monitor an experiment which calls
for aerating about 15 percent of the reservoir immediately above the
dam. Principal interest by Baltimore officials was to monitor water
for dissolved oxygen, temperature, and pH factor. The Data Collection
Platform (DCP) carried instrumentation to measure dissolved oxygen,
temperature, depth, pH, salinity, and conductivity. (Since the probes
were designed for use in seawater, clarity (transmittance), and con-
ductivity parameters would be virtually useless to determine changes
in fresh water or dissolved salts.)
In January 1976, Jerry Valcik, and a, technician, visited Wallops
Station to receive an informal briefing on the equipment involved in the
yi
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platform (antennae, the instrumented probe, power supply, signal
receiving/generating equipment). They picked up three complete
platforms and brought them back to Baltimore to prepare for installation.
An important aspect of this experiment was the communications
link from the platform to the Landsat satellite; from there to a receiving
station at Goddard'; Space Flight Center where the data would be partially
processed, with the print-outs being sent from Goddard to the Department
of Public Works for analysis. Since a communications link from the
platform to the Landsat was part of the experiment, Golden formally re-
quested, by letter, permission to use this link as an official task of
the BAP on February 3, 1976. On February 19, 1976, the loan of the
three data collection platforms by Wallops Station was made formal by
a memorandum and an equipment voucher assigning the platforms to the
Baltimore Applications Project and subsequently released to the Baltimore
Department of Public Works. At the end of February, the Assistant
Administrator for Applications at NASA Headquarters sent a letter to
the Director of Goddard asking several; questions about the experiment
i
in order to resolve the approval of the communication link with the
Landsat. Golden had been assured informally that the work should continue
on this experiment. Charles Cote developed a memorandum answering the l
questions, and this was forwarded through the formal Field Center channels
,r
to Headquarters. The approval for the Landsat link had not been completed	 €
by the end of June 1976, and some impatience was developing among those
involved at the Department of Public Works. Therefore, the Head of
r
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the Bureau of Operations (Gene Neff) sent a letter to NASA Headquarters
on July 1, seeking final approval for the DCP experiment. Formal
approval was forthcoming by letter of July 28, 1976 and the experiment
proceeded.
By late summer one of three data collection platforms had
been installed and was being calibrated with the assistance of Walter
Allen from Goddard. Allen made several trips to Baltimore in the process
of assisting in testing the platform. By September, data from the plat-
form was being received in Baltimore. Data was being checked to deter-
mind the reliability of the instrumentation and possible need for
additional calibration or adjustments of the instruments. Plans were
being developed to computerize the analysis at the Department of Public 	 `Y
Works so that raw data (using punched cards) could be used directly. If
the experiment proves successful,; there is hope that a data link may be
established to provide "real time" data from the Landsat to Goddard and
t
then to Baltimore. This would permit testing different arrangements of
the DCP, such as placing one in the Susquehanna River water intake to
check major variations in water quality at that point. Consideration
also is being given to determining the feasibility and the desirability
of purchasing or seeking the development of probe instrumentation which
would be more directly applicable to a wide range of fresh water para-
meters of interest to the Department of Public Works and the water
utility industry in particular.
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Insecticide Technology
This task began with a telephone call to Tom Golden during
the summer of 1974 from VanStory Branch, Director of Housing Management
in the Department of Housing and Community Development. He asked Golden
to look into the problem of maintaining effective roach control in public
housing units. Golden contacted several acquaintances in the Agricultural
Research Service, and after several conversations, was lead to Dr. F.
Eugene Wood, Extension Entymologist in the Department of Entyomology,
University of Maryland. 	 Wood was invited to meet with VanStory Branch j
and other officials in Baltimore about this problem. From that point
on, Wood took the initiative. 	 Branch assigned Mr. Clyde Frasier, a
landscape architect responsible for exterior maintenance in the housing	 3
projects,as his liaison for the task.	 Although pest control does not
come under Frasier's responsibility, he was assigned because he was the
most knowledgeable person in Branch's division who had experience in
dealing with chemicals, such as pesticides.	 With Frasier as his
principal liaison with the Department, Wood began to work closely with
pest control crews, reviewing their procedures and providing them with
special training in the handling of pesticides to include both effectiveness
and safety.
,:	 s
There was an almost immediate, noticeable improvement in the
morale of the control crews. 	 It should be remembered that pest control
crews are not welcomed by the residents of public housing units because
a
they are visible evidence of a "social" problem.	 Some residents refused
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scheduled treatment visits, and even went so far as to obtain a
"doctor's excuse" claiming a sensitivity to pesticide chemicals. This
put something of a social stigma on the crew, as well as providing
harboring areas for roaches while spray is being applied elsewhere.
Wood also worked with a specialist in nutrition education to
improve residents' domestic habits which could improve better health
and roach control.- Wood developed an extraordinary rapport with both
the control crew and with most residents in the developments where he
worked.
Wood became increasingly concerned about the lack of effective
pesticides, attacking the problem in three ways: (1) by trying new
chemical agents, (2) by continuing the crew's training; and (3) by
working on the problem of non-compliance among the residents through
meetings and educational efforts in cooperation with the nutrition
specialist. Wood sees some evidence that the roach population in the
Baltimore Public Housing Units, because of the combination of "regular"
spraying and considerable "non-compliance", has become largely immune
to most pesticides, having incorporated into the genetic material
(and/or behavior) capacity to survive most chemicals normally used.
Wood would like use this opportunity in Baltimore to conduct a series
of observations and experiments, ultimately leading to better means of
control.
VanStory Branch and other officials have been pleased with
Wood's operation; however, Wood believes that he is rapidly approaching
a&-^
i
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a "moment of truth".	 His recent experiment using different chemical
agents, has not proved particularly successful in controlling roaches,
and he believes that the roaches may have developed a cross-resistance,
making them very difficult to control--in fact, he has as much predicted
a "roach explosion" within two years if improved control mechanisms are
not developed.	 In addition, he is frustrated at his inability to obtain
any kind of "reward" from the department for the fine work by his crew--
he attempted to obtain uniforms to give them some visual recognition
(as well as easier entrance into the housing units), but this was turned
down by the Department.
There also appears to be some communication problem at the
supervisory levels about the crew in terms of an understanding and
acceptance of what Wood is trying to accomplish.	 Thus far, he has
been unable to penetrate the supervisory structure to produce a
permanent" change in the pattern by which roach control is applied--
crews are still assigned according to a mechanical schedule of spraying,
rotating through the various departmento, without any priority based
upon the differing, particular needs of thi.^ various units--some of which
might still be amenable to relatively simple preventive treatment. 	 [In
fact, it was at least partly due to the "regular", but ineffective,
spraying that permitted the gradual accommodation of the roach population,
building a resistance to the chemicals being used.]
Although this task has been widely viewed as most successful,
t o it has reached a point at which intervention is necessary or the task,
ti
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appears to be in jeopardy, possibly eliminating important potential
gains of both a practical and an experimental nature for roach control in
urban areas.
Baltimore Health Department Workshop
This task had its genesis in a series of discussions between
Golden and Dr. Marvin Rimmerman, Director of the Mayor's Office of
Telecommunications. Rimmerman had asked for Golden's assistance in
surveying a variety of communications problems and /or opportunities
in the City of Baltimore. Rimmerman was especially eager tc under-
take practical demonstrations of telecommunications technology
applicable to the City departments. Concurrently, Golden had been
discussing, with the Commissioner of Health, a variety of his concerns,
one of which was a modernized communication and information system for
the Iepartinent. Both the Commissioner of Health, Dr. John DeHoff,
and Rimmerman had participated in a workshop which brought a variety
of ;ity officials and experts together to explore questions involving
high rise housing for senior citizens. Based on that experience,
DeHoff and Rimmerman believed it would be useful to use the workshop
technique as the first step in exploring a possible demonstration of
communications/information systems technology for the Department of
Health. The purpose of the workshop was described as,
The type of function foreseen for the Workshop is one
of bridging the gap between two areas of specific
knowledge. The Workshop technique can, Hopefully,
provide the means of dialogue where user requirements
and technical system descriptions can be melded. At
D-11
the same time, to some degree at least the administra-
tive and operating requirements of the Department can
r be adapted (streamlined) to fit the new capability.*
1
Initial planning scheduled the workshop for April 1976.
pr. Edward Wolff, Deputy Director of the Goddard Communications and i
Navigation Division agreed to work with DeHoff and Rimmerman in the
x
planning and to conduct the workshop.	 Wolff had considerable experience
in conducting workshops of,a developmental and educational nature at
Goddard where technical and managerial . problems were involved. 	 Although
the workshop was to besponsored under the auspices of the Department
of Health, Rimmerman took the responsibility for arranging the participa-
tion of several communications experts from the Department of Commerce.
As the planning with DeHoff and senior staff of the Department of
Health progressed, it became more apparent that the departmental goals
`t
and philosophy and their relationships to organizational structure
were inadequately defined and understood. 	 Without clarification of
these areas it would prove difficult to make a realistic connection
with the technological side of improved communications and information
systems.	 Therefore, over a period of weeks, the planning for the work-
shop gradually shifted towards. more searching look at departmental
objectives and administration. 	 This is reflected in the memorandum
from the Commissioner to senior staff requesting nominations to the
f
' workshop, w
X
As you know, we have been planning an over-night one
f, and half day workshop for 22-23 July at the Donaldson-
*	 Baltimore Applications Project, Interim Progress Report, December 1975,
f page _3
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Brown Center in Port Deposit, Maryland. We began
by considering ways to improve communication and
administration through technology. It soon developed
that the first need was to understand what goes on in
these two Health Department modalities, and then go
on to developing the technology for improvement.
Therefore, the workshop will deal with health needs
of the cityand department modernization required to
meet them. **	 ,
The focus of the workshop then became an examination of
The state of the public health program in Baltimore
and the resources needed. Through the workshop we will
have a clear statement of the objectives for the Depart-
ment; we will discuss problems in achieving these
objectives. ***
Each of the thirty participants was asked to complete a list of:
(1) health problems, and (2) organizational needs, submitting these
in advance as list for discussion by the whole body and by the separate 	 ?
groups which were formed at the workshop. There was some concern about
the "lack of structure" in the workshop, but those who participated
concluded that it was a successful exercise, opening many doors, pro-
viding new opportunities for the exploration of these important issues
throughout the department. At the conclusion of the workshop, it was 	
.:	 y
the intention of the Commissioner to review the many findings and
recommendations, then move to take next steps in redefining the goals
and administrative arrangements to meet those goals.
** Memorandum from John"DeHoff, M.D., Commissioner of Health, Subject,
Workshop at Port Deposit, Maryland, June 7, 1976.
** 'Memorandum from John DeHoff, M.C.; Commissioner of Health, Subject,
Workshop at Port Deposit, Maryland, June 22, 1976.	 j
43
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The one negative note in this task was that, as the final
planning for the workshop moved along in the Department of Health,
apparently Rimmerman was not kept informed about the shift in emphasis.
He was mildly disgruntled at not being invited until the last moment,
t
as well as having the tentative arrangements he made for bringing in
federal attendees shortcut.
k
Solarization Experiments
Five separate tasks can be included under the general title
of "Solarization Experiments",: 	 (1) the Sharpe-Leadenhall School,
(2) solar-assisted hot water heating, (3) Upton Center solar heating
demonstration, (4) convention center solar energy system,- and (5)
Baltimore aquarium solar energy demonstration. 	 Two of these will be
discussed in some detail--the Upton Center solar heating demonstration
i project and the Sharpe-Leadenhall School project.
1
From the beginning of the BAP, Golden was convinced that the
whole area of energy and energy conservation held substantial potential-
for innovative applications.	 Golden engaged in a series of discussions
with Berkowitz on emerging projects in the City ' s capital construction
plans to determine where there might be a potential for demonstrating
solar energy applications.	 Concurrently, he arranged a series of
educational sessions to develop'a better understanding of solar energy
and its possibilities among officials in the City. 	 In this he was
considerably assisted by Mr. Emil Hymowitz of the International Projects
,t
r^
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Office in the Engineering Directorate at Goddard. Hymowitz had
extensive experience in spacecraft technology and had taken over
responsibility for directing the Greenbelt Solar Demonstration
Project--a local demonstration of solar energy applied to domestic 	 i
heating and domestic hot water use. Arrangements were made to
bring in engineering consultants, specialists from industry, and
experts from Federal agencies to provide briefings, discussions, etc.
for City officials. Field trips to Goddard Space Flight Center,
several industrial sites, and to other Field Centers were arranged
to provide first-hand contact on the Part of City officials with
research and demonstration in solar energy,
During the review of potential construction projects,
Berkowitz and Golden identified two as being likely candidates for
solar energy application--the Upton Multi-Purpose .Center and the
Sharpe-Leadenhall School. The first involved the planning and develop-
ment of a City service which, incorporated a number of City functions
to serve a particular neighborhood. The Upton Center was in the
stage of architectural-engineering work permitting "intervention" and
the nature of the building and its location suggested that it would
be a good candidate for the kind of solar application demonstration
which might earn a grant from the Federal Energy Rea.earch and Develop-
ment Agency. (Golden had alerted City officials to the fact that both
9
the ERDA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development were
j
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offering a series of Federal grants for demonstration projects to
conserve or make innovative demonstration projects in the areas of
solar energy.)
Golden worked closely with officials of the Planning Department
and the Department of Housing and Community Development which have a
joint responsibility for the Upton Center Project.	 In addition, he
brought together officials from the Department of Public Works who
had a monitoring function and put them in touch with the engineering
consultants, Mueller Associates, Inc., who had been retained by the
architect responsible for designing the Upton Center. 	 The two
engineers responsible from Mueller were Andrew J. Parker, and Robert
E. Hedden.	 Parker and Hedden agreed that the Upton project was a
good candidate for a possible demonstration project and suggested that,
of the various alternatives available among ERDA programs,
	 the City
try for a PON (Program Opportunity Notice) type of program which in-
volved a shared-cost grant.	 Golden played principally a liaison
function in the development of the actual grant proposal, working with
the engineering consultants and representatives of the City agencies
involved.	 From the viewpoint of the consultants, it was especially
helpful in "shepherding" the project through the necessary City channels.
Goddard engineers assisted through computer "modeling" during the design
r
phase.	 From the viewpoint of the City officials, Golden provided
technical assurance and made available information of an understandable
nature that could keep them current with the state of planning and progress.
1 ^.	 I	 I	 f	 1	 l	 F
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The grant proposal proved to be successful with the City
being awarded the grant, Bernard Berkowitz acting as the project
manager for the City on the project. The project is expected to
be completed by early 1977.
The Sharpe-Leadenhall School represents another attempt to
win a Federal grant for a solar energy demonstration project. In
this case, Golden worked closely with the engineers/architects for
the school (the solar demonstration being only one part of the con-
struction project.), with the Assistant Superintendent for Physical
Plant, Curtis Lantz, the school architect, Grinnell Locke, and with
two representatives of the General Electric Company, William Terrill,
and William Moore. This task involved an innovative approach by which
solar collectors on the roof of the school would be incorporated into
the roof design and support system, rather than being merely an "add-
on" to the roof. Like the Upton project, Golden acted principally as
a liaison agent arranging for briefings and meetings at which informa-
tion was made available to City officials, facilitating the inter-
action of General Electric representatives with the engineers/architects
and school officials. A number of representatives from Goddard assisted,
providing "back-up expertise" during the preparation of the proposal.
Unfortunately, the Sharpe-Leadenhall project did not receive
an ERDA grant--Golden believes, because the proposed design was more
risky that ERDA wished to chance in a program where it was hoped the
demonstration would be not so much experimental but successful, encouraging
further and rapid application of solar energy technology.
IF
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One of the principal reasons for undertaking these various
tasks in solar energy, from Golden's viewpoint, was to give City
officials confidence in how to specify technologically more sophisticated
products--particularly within an area which has considerable potential
for growth in the future.
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Appendix E
Z
Persons Interviewed - Baltimore
Department of Public Works Fire Department
Edward Bochenek, Chief,Technical Thomas Burke, Chief
Services
S m Cortese, Highway Management
Division Department of Education
Walter Koterwas, Chief, Division of
Treatment & Pumping, Water Supply Curtis Lantz, Assistant Superintendent
Richard Kretzschmar, Chief, Water of Physical Plant
Division,,Engineering
Francis W..Kuchta, Director
Eugene Neff, Deputy Director, Public Department of Planning
Wbrks Department, County of
Baltimore, (formerly Head, Bureau Victor Bonaparte, Upton Center
of Operations, Department of Coordinator
Public Works, Baltimore City Sydney Brower	 Chief of Planning Section
H. Singh Patheja, Public Works Neil Curran, Chief, Economic Analysis
Engineer Section
Martin Reizenstein, Division of Sheldon Lynn, Deputy Director of
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Water Planning
William E. Riley, Head, Bureau of Larry Reich, Director
Engineering
Te-" 	!In' ^ 4 U
	
Chief	 Water nw , 14
Sectiot,	 Parks and Recreation Department
William Buna, Chief Engineer
Housing and Community Development 	 Douglas Tawney, Director
VanStory Branch, Director, Division
of Housing Management 	 Health Department
Jay Brodie, Deputy Commissioner
Robert Embry, Commissioner	 William Dahle, Director, industrial
Larry Merrill, Project Scheduling 	 Health
t Coordinator	 John DeHoff, Commissioner
James Rhyne, Deputy Commissioner
Mayor's Office
Department of Transit and Traffic
James Beek, Assis
.
tant Press
Officer	 Hugo Liem, Commissioner
Bernard Berkowitz, Mayor's Coordinator
	 Norbert Nitsch, Jr., Assistant
for Physical Development
	 Commissioner
Marvin Rimmerman, Director of Telecom-
munications
BAP Project Office
Jack Peake, Director
Tom Golden, Project Director
GSFC Director's Office
Donald Hearth, former Deputy Director
Administration and Management Directorate
Charles Boyle, Chief, Special Programs
Officer
James Robinson, Chief, Planning Section,
Facilities Engineering
Division
Applications Directorate
Walter Al—len, Mobile Radio Determina-
tion Branch, i
Edward Wolff;, Associate Chief, Communica-
tions and Navigation Division
Fred Gordon, Missions Utilization Office
Charles Cote, Data Cdllection Systems Branch,
Communications and Navigation
Division
Technical Utilization Office 	 j
Donald Friedman, Chief
Engineering Directorate 3
Emil Hymowitz, Program Director, ANS, IRAS
i Greenbelt Projects 	 3,
University of Maryland	 a
F. Eugene Wood, Extension Entymologist
P
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Police Department
Major Ronald J. Mullen, Director of
Planning and Research
Major Robert Norton, Director of
Communications
Baltimore City Hospitals
S Walter Williams, Division of
Hospital Services
Mueller Associates, Inc.
Robert E. Hedden, Program Manager,	 !
Energy and Environmental Systems!
Andrew J. Parker, Vice President
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